The Global Centre for Risk and Innovation (GCRI)
Roads, rail and public transport carry people to work, school, care and safety, and carry responders and supplies in emergencies. Networks fail when links are cut by floods, landslides, heat or crashes, and when power or signalling stops. This page sets out how disruption spreads through transport networks, how network resilience is measured, and what evidence serves the transport authorities and operators responsible for them.
Transport and mobility · Lifeline system A · Register v3
| SS-12 | Electricity | Tier 1 | Flood 1-in-100 | 21 |
| WTW-2 | Water | Tier 1 | Flood 1-in-100 | 23 |
| DX-1 | Telecom | Tier 2 | Heat | 4 |
| H-Campus | Health | Tier 1 | Earthquake | 93 |
| PN-3 | Transport | Tier 2 | Storm surge | n/a |
red: SS-12 and its dependants
Fig.Asset criticality register. Design wireframe with placeholder names and illustrative values, not a record or a live system.
Transport network resilience is the ability of roads, rail and public transport to keep moving people and goods through disruption and to recover quickly. It depends on critical links without alternatives, on design for floods and heat, and on power and signalling, and disruption falls hardest on people without other options.
For transport and mobility, in GCRI's spatial-intelligence reading, the map opens on night lights, population density and true-colour imagery with relief in 3D, framed on Western Europe; 3 further NASA layers wait in the list.
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Infrastructure exposure, for this page
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NASA GIBS / EOSDIS · ASTER GDEM (METI, NASA) · Blue Marble (NASA) · © OpenStreetMap contributors (ODbL) · Natural Earth
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For transport and mobility, in GCRI's spatial-intelligence reading, the map opens on night lights, population density and true-colour imagery with relief in 3D, framed on Western Europe; 3 further NASA layers wait in the list.Satellite and model products as NASA publishes them, each with its own date; indicators, not assessments of any place; claim ceiling INTEGRATED.
Layers and dates
Mobility networks, ports, rail and critical access. The dossier below sets out how the risk develops, what is measured, where the data come from, how it is modelled and who decides.
Some bridges, tunnels and road sections have no practical detour. Their loss isolates communities or forces long diversions that multiply travel time.
Floods close roads and rail, heat buckles rails and softens asphalt, landslides block mountain routes, and snow and ice slow everything. Each needs different design and response.
Metros, electric rail and traffic signals stop when power or signalling fails. Passengers may be stranded underground or between stations.
People without cars, with disabilities or in remote areas depend on a few routes and services. Disruption cuts their access to jobs and care first.
Each term as this page uses it. Where a standard-setting body defines the term, the wording follows that body.
| Term | Definition |
|---|---|
| Critical link | A network link whose closure causes large travel time increases or isolates places. |
| Accessibility | The ease of reaching destinations such as jobs and services by available transport. |
| Detour ratio | The length of the shortest alternative route relative to the original route when a link closes. |
Each indicator carries its unit, its cadence, the kind of source behind it and the evidence label a value would carry. No values are shown: a programme supplies them under its own authority.
| Indicator | Unit | Cadence | Source type | Label |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Network links without alternative route | count of links | per assessment | Network analysis | MODELLED |
| Travel time increase under link closure | percent increase | per scenario | Transport models | MODELLED |
| Weather-related closures | hours of closure by cause | annual | Road and rail operator records | OBSERVED |
| Public transport service reliability | percent of scheduled services operated | monthly | Operator performance data | OBSERVED |
| Population with access to essential services by public transport | percent within a stated travel time | per assessment | Accessibility analysis | MODELLED |
| Rail heat-related incidents | count | annual | Rail operator records | REPORTED |
The topic as a computational graph: named sources feed the methods, an evidence review gates the outputs, and the decisions stay with the authorities that hold them.
Fig. 02Nodes carry their type, two metric rows and a state; connectors show what feeds what; dashed frames name the owners; the timeline is the cadence. Design of the pipeline, not a record of a run.
Named public datasets and institutional records, each with its licence class. Sources by agreement are used only under their terms and never republished.
| Source | What it gives | Licence class |
|---|---|---|
| OpenStreetMap road and rail networks | Network geometry for routing and accessibility | Open, ODbL |
| GTFS public transport feeds | Published schedules and stops from transport agencies | Open, licence per agency |
| National road and rail operator performance statistics | Closures, delays and reliability | Public records, licence per operator |
| Global Roads Inventory Project (GRIP) | Global road network dataset | Open, licence to check |
| Copernicus and national flood hazard maps | Hazard exposure of transport links | Terms per source |
Critical Infrastructure prepares evidence. The decisions below are taken by the authorities named, under their own rules, and never by the platform.
| Who decides | The question | Evidence this page serves |
|---|---|---|
| Transport ministries and road authorities | Which links to strengthen or duplicate | Critical link analyses; hazard exposure |
| Public transport operators | How to keep essential services running in disruptions | Reliability data; accessibility analyses |
| Emergency planners | Which routes responders and evacuees depend on | Critical links; travel time under closure |
Mobility networks are vulnerable at bridges, tunnels, junctions and single access roads. When these fail, travel times can increase sharply or communities can be cut off. Rail and metro systems depend on electricity for traction and signalling; road networks depend on traffic signals and fuel distribution. A widespread power outage can paralyse a city's movement even if no transport asset is damaged.
Access is unequal. People without cars, older residents and those on the edges of networks are most affected by disruption. The shift to electric vehicles and electrified public transport reduces some risks while increasing dependence on the grid and on charging infrastructure.
The chapter is set out on the transport and mobility chapter, and freight nodes are covered in transport and logistics nodes.
Network models from urban and transport engineering measure travel times to essential services before and during disruption.
Methods from network science and contagion identify links whose loss causes the greatest loss of access.
Simulation from optimization and operations research tests response times when routes are blocked.
Travel behaviour changes in crises in ways that models capture poorly. Network data may not reflect informal routes, and access measures depend on which services are counted as essential.
The current service level is R0: information and enquiries. An enquiry receives a reference and names the next step; applications, payments, compute allocations and registrations open only when their team, terms and review capacity exist.