GCRI · 量子技术
量子通信
Quantum communications use quantum states of light to distribute encryption keys with security rooted in physics, and in future to link quantum computers and sensors in networks. Quantum key distribution works over limited distances and needs dedicated hardware and trusted nodes today. This page sets out how quantum communications work, what they can and cannot secure, and what evidence serves the network operators and security agencies weighing them.
Quantum communications in seven parts.
Quantum communications: how the risk develops.
Communications research and deployment limits. The dossier below sets out how the risk develops, what is measured, where the data come from, how it is modelled and who decides.
Measurement reveals eavesdropping
In quantum key distribution, measuring a quantum state disturbs it, so an eavesdropper introduces detectable errors. Keys are kept only when error rates are low.
Distance is limited by loss
Photons are lost in fibre, limiting direct links. Longer networks use trusted relay nodes or satellites, each with security implications.
Implementations can be attacked
Real devices deviate from ideal theory. Side-channel attacks on detectors and sources have been demonstrated, so security depends on implementation and certification.
Quantum networks are early
Distributing entanglement between distant nodes needs quantum repeaters and memories, which are still in research.
后量子迁移追踪器。
团队跟踪该主题时会使用的界面：其指标、状态与决策。名称为示例，数值仅作示意。
后量子迁移跟踪器
Quantum communications · Crypto inventory · Wave 2
移民
- 清单所有加密算法
- 确定优先次序数据寿命
- 选择标准算法
- 混合部署经典算法与后量子密码
- 检验互操作性
- 切换退役
按优先级排列的系统
| 存档签名 | RSA-2048 | 28 | ML-DSA 混合 | 试点 |
| VPN 网关 | ECDH | 9 | ML-KEM 混合方案 | 已计划 |
| 支付 HSM | RSA-3072 | 11 | 供应商路线图 | 已阻止 |
| Web TLS | ECDHE | 2 | 混合密钥交换 | 已完成 |
进度
Quantum communication touches the networks domains depend on.
- 能源耦合Grid control networks are candidate users of quantum key distribution.What to watchCost and range limits
- 卫生耦合Health networks weigh QKD against post-quantum cryptography.What to watchAgency guidance on QKD use
- 水耦合Utilities are more likely to migrate to post-quantum algorithms.What to watchAlgorithm migration plans
Communication studies are designed for the 指数级技术系列. Standards work sits in ETSI’s QKD group and the ITU-T Y.3800 series; several national security agencies prefer post-quantum cryptography to QKD for most uses.
- Network trial reports.
- Security analyses of QKD implementations.
How quantum communications is modelled, measured and tested.
模型、其假设、数据和不确定性，以科学家或工程师会核查的形式呈现。结构遵循已发表的方法。所取数值仅为示意，不是研究发现。
系统模型
The couplings between the systems in quantum communications: signs of influence, a reinforcing and a balancing loop, and cross-links where stress jumps.
衡量什么，以及衡量得如何。
每个指标都注明其单位、频率、背后的来源类型以及数值将附带的证据标签。此处不显示数值：数值由计划依据其自身权限提供。
| 指标 | 单位 | 节奏 | 来源类型 | 标签 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| QKD link distance | kilometres | per demonstration | Published experiments | 已报告 |
| Secret key rate | bits per second at a stated distance | per demonstration | Published experiments | 已报告 |
| Deployed QKD network nodes | 计数 | 年度 | Operator and government reports | 已报告 |
| Security evaluations completed for QKD products | 计数 | 年度 | Evaluation scheme records | 已发布统计 |
| Quantum memory storage time | milliseconds | per experiment | Peer-reviewed results | 观测 |
| Satellite QKD demonstrations | 计数 | 年度 | Agency reports | 已报告 |
证据来自何处。
具名公共数据集与机构记录，各自注明许可类别。依协议获得的来源仅按其条款使用，绝不再次发布。
| 来源 | 它提供什么 | 许可类别 |
|---|---|---|
| ETSI ISG QKD specifications | Component, interface and security specifications | Public, ETSI terms |
| ITU-T Y.3800 系列 | Network recommendations for QKD | Public, ITU terms |
| National cyber agency positions on QKD | Agency views on QKD versus post-quantum cryptography | Public, terms per agency |
| EuroQCI programme documentation | European quantum communication infrastructure plans | Public, EU terms |
| Peer-reviewed quantum communication literature | Experimental results | Licence per article |
由谁决定，以及证据服务于什么。
Quantum Technologies prepares evidence. The decisions below are taken by the authorities named, under their own rules, and never by the platform.
| 谁来决定 | 问题 | 本页面服务的证据 |
|---|---|---|
| Network operators | Whether QKD fits any of their links and threat models | Use comparisons; architecture reviews |
| National cyber agencies | What position to take on QKD for government use | Implementation security evidence |
| 研究资助方 | How to fund quantum network research | Progress on memories and repeaters |
该主题产生的产出
- Comparisons of QKD and post-quantum cryptography for specific uses
- Network architecture reviews including trusted nodes
- Summaries of implementation security evidence
- Evidence notes for operators
专家提出的问题。
Communications questions weigh physical security against practical limits.
- What security does quantum key distribution actually provide, and under what assumptions?
- How far can quantum signals travel through fibre or free space before they are lost?
- Do trusted relay nodes undermine end-to-end security?
- How do implementation flaws in real devices open side channels?
- How does quantum key distribution compare with post-quantum cryptography for a given use?
机制与驱动因素。
Quantum key distribution relies on the principle that measuring a quantum state disturbs it, so two parties can detect an eavesdropper and agree a secret key. The security of the ideal protocol rests on physics rather than on assumptions about computational difficulty. Real 系统, however, use imperfect sources and detectors, and several attacks have exploited those imperfections.
Photons are absorbed and scattered in fibre, which limits direct links to relatively short distances. Longer networks currently rely on trusted nodes, where the key is held in classical form and must be protected conventionally. Quantum repeaters, which would extend range without trusted nodes, remain a research goal. Satellites have been used to demonstrate links over long distances.
如何研究，以及方法止于何处。
| 方法或数据 | 显示内容 | 局限 |
|---|---|---|
| Security proofs | Theoretical security of protocols | Proofs assume idealised devices |
| Implementation testing and quantum hacking research | Vulnerabilities in real equipment | Testing cannot prove the absence of flaws |
| Network trials | Performance, key rates and operations | Trials are limited in scale and duration |
| Comparative security assessment | When quantum or post-quantum approaches fit | Depends on threat model and system constraints |
Where this page’s references lead.
阅读本页时所对照的机构和文件。状态和版本会变化；每个链接都指向发布机构。
问题与解答。
What is quantum key distribution?
Is QKD unbreakable?
Should organisations use QKD or post-quantum cryptography?
Is quantum key distribution unbreakable?
Does quantum communication replace post-quantum cryptography?
What is a quantum internet?
从本页贡献证据。
报告 is the Consortium’s quarterly publication. What you know about this subject can become evidence, a case or a correction in the next edition, credited to you and published under CC BY 4.0 where it is your own work.
- 电子邮件网关 GW-GCRI从本页发送证据、更正、案例、方法、审查、翻译或概况投稿。它会带上本页标签送达，由负责的编辑接收。
- Zenodo开放存缴存缴并提交到社区用您的 ORCID iD 在 Zenodo 上发布您自己的记录，然后提交到那里的 Reports 社区。由策展人审核；DOI 仍归您所有。
- 报告GCRI查看所有贡献方式贡献类型、各自的评审方式、您获得的署名、许可协议，以及绝不接受的内容。
切勿发送个人数据、敏感基础设施细节或您无权分享的任何内容。贡献在使用前会经过审查；发送贡献不赋予署名权或编辑权，赞助也绝不能换取研究结论。
法律文件。
本网站上的地图、数据和图表仅作为背景和一般信息展示。它们不是建议、预测或预警；信息的局限见免责声明和数据说明。