GCRI · Society and Human Development
Media and information systems
In a crisis, what people know depends on news media, social platforms, messaging apps, authority channels and word of mouth. These systems can save lives by spreading accurate warnings and guidance, or spread rumours and false information that cost them. This page sets out how information systems work in crises and over time, how information quality and access are measured, and what evidence serves the authorities, media and civil society involved.
Media and information systems in seven parts.
- 01The questionMedia and information systems: how the risk develops
- 02Across the domainsInformation systems carry risk messages for every domain
- 03IndicatorsWhat is measured, and how well
- 04SourcesWhere the evidence comes from
- 05DecisionsWho decides, and what the evidence serves
- 06Core questionsThe questions experts ask
- 07MechanismsThe ecosystem and its fragilities
Media and information systems: how the risk develops.
Media and public information as social systems. The dossier below sets out how the risk develops, what is measured, where the data come from, how it is modelled and who decides.
Local news is shrinking
Loss of local journalism leaves communities with fewer trusted sources and less scrutiny of local institutions.
Messaging apps carry crisis information
Private messaging groups spread information quickly, including rumours, and are hard for authorities to monitor or correct.
Platforms amplify what engages
Recommendation systems favour content that draws attention, which can amplify fear, outrage and false claims in a crisis.
Trusted messengers matter
People act on information from sources they trust, such as community leaders, health workers and local media, more than on distant authorities.
Social protection and cohesion.
The screen a team would use to follow this subject: its measures, states and decisions. Names are examples and values are illustrative.
Social protection and cohesion
Media and information systems · Urban ward 9 · Year 2
Coverage by quintile
Cohesion survey
| Trust in neighbours | 63 | 51 | ▲ 2 |
| Trust in local authority | 48 | 52 | ▲ 1 |
| Reported discrimination | 9 | 11 | ▲ 2 |
Information systems carry risk messages for every domain.
Findings are designed for the Evidence Brief series. The UN Global Principles for Information Integrity (2024) frame the field.
- Media monitoring studies.
- Evaluations of information interventions.
How media and information systems is modelled, measured and tested.
The model, its assumptions, its data and its uncertainty, in the form a scientist or engineer would check. Structures follow published methods. The values drawn are illustrative, not findings.
System model
The couplings between the systems in media and information systems: signs of influence, a reinforcing and a balancing loop, and cross-links where stress jumps.
What is measured, and how well.
Each indicator carries its unit, its cadence, the kind of source behind it and the evidence label a value would carry. No values are shown: a programme supplies them under its own authority.
| Indicator | Unit | Cadence | Source type | Label |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Trust in news | percent trusting most news most of the time | annual | News consumption surveys | REPORTED |
| Main source of news by type | percent of respondents | annual | News consumption surveys | REPORTED |
| Journalists killed or imprisoned | count | annual | Press freedom monitors | REPORTED |
| Local news outlets | count per region | per assessment | Media mapping studies | ESTIMATED |
| Rumours tracked in crisis response | count by theme | per event | Community feedback systems | REPORTED |
| Population reached by authority crisis messages | percent | per event | Post-event surveys | REPORTED |
Where the evidence comes from.
Named public datasets and institutional records, each with its licence class. Sources by agreement are used only under their terms and never republished.
| Source | What it gives | Licence class |
|---|---|---|
| Reuters Institute Digital News Report | News use and trust across countries | Public report, terms per publisher |
| UNESCO Observatory of Killed Journalists and World Trends in Freedom of Expression | Safety of journalists and media freedom | Public, UNESCO terms |
| Committee to Protect Journalists data | Journalists killed and imprisoned | Public, terms to check |
| WHO infodemic management resources | Methods for managing information in health emergencies | Public, WHO terms of use |
| IFRC and partner community feedback and rumour tracking guidance | Methods for listening to communities in crises | Public, IFRC terms (to check) |
Who decides, and what the evidence serves.
Society and Human Development prepares evidence. The decisions below are taken by the authorities named, under their own rules, and never by the platform.
| Who decides | The question | Evidence this page serves |
|---|---|---|
| Public health and emergency authorities | How to reach people with accurate information in crises | Ecosystem assessments; trust profiles |
| Media organisations and regulators | How to support local journalism and information quality | Media mapping and freedom evidence |
| Humanitarian agencies | How to listen to and respond to community concerns | Rumour tracking evidence |
Outputs this topic produces
- Information ecosystem assessments for crisis communication
- Rumour tracking and community feedback methods
- Media access and trust profiles
- Evidence notes for risk communication
The questions experts ask.
- How is the information ecosystem structured, and who controls its key channels?
- What happens to public knowledge when local news declines?
- How do information flows behave during crises, and where do they break?
- Which communities are poorly served by mainstream channels?
- How do economic models of media affect the quality of risk information?
The ecosystem and its fragilities.
Information ecosystems combine professional media, platforms, messaging apps, community channels and authority sources. The decline of local journalism in many places has reduced coverage of local government, hazards and public health. Platforms have become major gatekeepers, and their ranking and moderation choices shape exposure to information. Encrypted messaging networks carry both community support and rumour, and are hard to observe.
During crises, demand for information surges while normal channels may fail through power and network outages. Rumours fill gaps when authority information is slow or distrusted. Language, literacy, disability and connectivity determine who receives timely information. Concentration of ownership and dependence on advertising revenue influence what is covered and how.
Resilient information systems share some features: diverse sources, trusted local intermediaries, channels that work without the internet such as radio, information in the languages people speak, and authority communicators who are open about uncertainty and correct themselves quickly. These features can be studied, compared and strengthened.
Public service and community media often play an outsized role in crises because they reach people without internet access and are locally trusted. Their funding and independence are therefore part of a society’s risk infrastructure, a point the field documents with comparative evidence across countries.
Methods and limits.
Ecosystem mapping
Mapping outlets, audiences and flows of information in a place.
Content analysis
Systematic analysis of coverage and narratives; large-scale methods need careful validation.
Audience research
Surveys and qualitative work on how people find and judge information.
Limits: platform data access is restricted, private messaging is largely unobservable, and rapidly changing technology dates findings quickly.
How it is studied, and what the methods cannot say.
- 01Social and behavioural scienceSurvey design for hard-to-reach groups · Qualitative and participatory researchApplied here
- 02Causal inference and impact evaluationEvaluating cash transfers · Effects of disasters on households · Education programme evaluationApplied here
- 03Spatial statistics and geostatisticsSmall-area poverty estimation · Vulnerability and hazard overlayApplied here
Where this page’s references lead.
The bodies and documents this page is read against. Status and editions change; each link goes to the issuing body.
Questions and answers.
What is an infodemic?
Why does local journalism matter in a crisis?
What is rumour tracking?
Does the platform rate media outlets?
How is this different from the chapter?
Is GCRI a media regulator?
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