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GCRI · Systemic Risk Management

Assurance and correction

Assurance asks whether risk management works as described; correction makes sure that when it does not, records and decisions change. Internal audit, independent review, incident investigation and learning systems provide the checks. This page sets out how assurance is organised, why it can miss systemic weaknesses, and how corrections are recorded so that the evidence behind a decision stays traceable after the facts change.

01Register

Assurance and correction on the record.

02The question

Assurance and correction: how the risk develops.

Evidence, review and methods correction. The dossier below sets out how the risk develops, what is measured, where the data come from, how it is modelled and who decides.

Mechanism

Assurance tests what it is shown

Reviews examine the processes and records put in front of them. Risks that fall outside the scope, or between the scopes of several reviewers, go untested.

Mechanism

Investigations stop at the first cause

Incident reviews that end at the person or component closest to the failure miss the organisational and design conditions behind it. Those conditions remain and produce the next incident.

Mechanism

Corrections must reach the record

When an assumption, dataset or model proves wrong, decisions built on it need revisiting. Without versioned records, the correction is made in one place and the error persists elsewhere.

Mechanism

Actions decay before closure

Audit and incident actions are agreed, then deferred as priorities shift. Overdue actions accumulate and the weaknesses they were meant to fix stay open.

03Monitor

Risk register.

The screen a team would use to follow this subject: its measures, states and decisions. Names are examples and values are illustrative.

Risk register

Assurance and correction · Enterprise A · Review cycle Q4

Three risks above appetiteGCRI · Systemic Risk Management

Residual risk

likelihood × impact, risks per cell

Counts of risks per cell. Shading follows the appetite bands.

Above appetite

Supplier concentrationProcurementHigh▲ 2
Data centre floodingOperationsHigh▲ 0
Model error in pricingFinanceMedium▲ 1
Key staff lossPeopleMedium▼ 1

Risk management process, after the international standard

  1. Scope, context, criteriaset
  2. Identifytaxonomy
  3. Analyselikelihood · impact
  4. Evaluatevs appetite
  5. Treatplans
  6. Monitor and reviewKRIs
  7. Record and reportboard

Treatment actions

  1. T-11Dual-source critical componentOwner: procurement · overdue9 d late
  2. T-14Move backup site above flood levelOwner: operationsdue 14 d
  3. T-17Independent model validationOwner: financedue 20 d
Risk register: the screen’s structure, terms and states for Assurance and correction.Example names and illustrative values; a design, not a record or a live system.
04Across the domains

Assurance checks that risk evidence in every domain can be trusted.

05Methods and evidence

How assurance and correction is modelled, measured and tested.

The model, its assumptions, its data and its uncertainty, in the form a scientist or engineer would check. Structures follow published methods. The values drawn are illustrative, not findings.

Model, equations and assumptions

The model structure used for assurance and correction, the assumptions it makes and how each is tested.

Risk of element iRi = f(Hi, Ei, Vi, Ci)hazard, exposure, vulnerability and coping capacity
Expected annual lossEAL = ∑k pk · Lkover events k with annual probability pk
Coupled systemsxt+1 = A xt + B ut + εtA carries the couplings, u the shock, ε the error
AssumptionWhy it is madeHow it is tested
Hazard and exposure are independent within an eventKeeps the loss integral tractableCompare with a copula fit on joint records
Couplings are linear near the operating pointLets shocks propagate through APerturb beyond the linear range and compare
Vulnerability curves transfer between placesLocal curves are rarely availableValidate against observed losses where they exist
Inputs
versioned datasets with provenance
Outputs
distributions, never single numbers
Code
released with the model card and tests
Reproduction
same data, code, environment and seed
Standard risk and state-space formulations; the assumptions listed are typical of the method, stated for review, not results.
FAIR guiding principles · GO FAIR and FORCE11W3C PROV · World Wide Web ConsortiumGuidance on consistent treatment of uncertainties · IPCCCEOS Analysis Ready Data · Committee on Earth Observation Satellites
06Indicators

What is measured, and how well.

Each indicator carries its unit, its cadence, the kind of source behind it and the evidence label a value would carry. No values are shown: a programme supplies them under its own authority.

IndicatorUnitCadenceSource typeLabel
Principal risks covered by assurancepercent of principal risks reviewed in the cycleannualAssurance mapsREPORTED
Overdue audit actionscount by age bandquarterlyAudit action trackingREPORTED
Incident investigations reaching organisational factorspercent of investigationsannualInvestigation reportsREPORTED
Corrections issued to published risk evidencecount with reason recordedcontinuousCorrection logOBSERVED
Repeat incidentscount of incidents with a previously identified causeannualIncident databasesOBSERVED
Independent reviews of the risk frameworkdate of last external reviewper reviewGovernance recordsDECLARED
07Sources

Where the evidence comes from.

Named public datasets and institutional records, each with its licence class. Sources by agreement are used only under their terms and never republished.

SourceWhat it givesLicence class
Global Internal Audit StandardsRequirements for internal audit independence, planning and reporting, from The Institute of Internal AuditorsPublic, IIA terms of use
The IIA Three Lines ModelRoles of management, risk functions and internal audit in assurancePublic, IIA terms of use
National audit office reportsIndependent public sector audit findings on risk and resiliencePublic records, licence per office
Safety investigation board reportsInvestigations that trace organisational and systemic factorsPublic records, terms per board
Retraction Watch databaseRecords of retracted and corrected research used in evidence basesOpen, Crossref terms (to check)
08Decisions

Who decides, and what the evidence serves.

Systemic Risk Management prepares evidence. The decisions below are taken by the authorities named, under their own rules, and never by the platform.

Who decidesThe questionEvidence this page serves
Audit committeesWhether assurance over principal risks is sufficient and independentAssurance maps; overdue actions; external review dates
Chief audit executivesWhere to direct audit effort in the next planCoverage gaps; repeat incidents
Public accounts committees and legislaturesWhether public bodies have acted on findingsAudit office reports; action status

Outputs this topic produces

  • Assurance maps that show coverage gaps across lines and reviewers
  • Investigation protocols that trace organisational and design factors
  • Correction and versioning procedures for published risk evidence
  • Action tracking templates with ageing and escalation
09Core questions

What assurance experts ask.

  • Is the evidence that controls work independent of the people who run them?
  • Are models validated against data they were not built on, and are their limits documented?
  • When an error is found, is it corrected openly, with a record of what changed and why?
  • Do near misses and small failures lead to learning, or are they explained away?
  • Who checks the checkers: is there a route for staff and outsiders to raise concerns that bypasses the line being reviewed?
  • Are corrections traced through to every decision, report and model that relied on the flawed result?
10Mechanisms

Why assurance weakens.

Assurance tends to erode quietly. Reviews become routine, findings repeat from one cycle to the next and the people being reviewed learn what reviewers look for. Major failures often follow years of assurance reports that described controls as effective.

Independence

Too close to the work

Reviewers who depend on those they review, or who designed the controls, find fewer problems.

Form over substance

Checking the paperwork

Assurance that checks whether processes are documented rather than whether they work.

Silent edits

Unrecorded change

Methods and models changed without records, so no one can tell what earlier results relied on.

11Methods and limits

How assurance and correction work.

  1. 01

    Model validation

    Independent testing of models against data, benchmarks and expert review, using uncertainty quantification and model validation. Limits: validation is harder for models of rare events.

  2. 02

    Internal and external audit

    Independent review of controls and governance. Limits: audit samples, and its findings depend on scope.

  3. 03

    Version control and provenance

    Records of data, code and method versions behind each result. Limits: requires discipline to maintain.

  4. 04

    Open correction

    Published corrections with reasons and dates. Limits: requires a culture that values correction over reputation.

12Methods

How it is studied, and what the methods cannot say.

  1. Decision analysis under uncertaintyMulti-criteria treatment choice · Decision trees for contingent plansApplied here
  2. Probability and statisticsFrequency and severity modelling · Dependence between risks · Combining data and judgementApplied here
  3. Uncertainty quantification and model validationPropagating input uncertainty · Separating kinds of uncertainty · Deep uncertainty framingApplied here
13Where this page’s references

Where this page’s references lead.

The bodies and documents this page is read against. Status and editions change; each link goes to the issuing body.

14Questions

Questions and answers.

What does assurance mean in risk management?
An objective examination that gives a stated level of confidence that risk management, controls and governance operate as intended, provided by internal audit, external reviewers or other independent functions.
Why trace organisational factors in investigations?
Because the conditions that allowed a failure, such as design, staffing, incentives and procedures, usually outlast the individual event. Fixing only the immediate cause leaves them in place.
How are corrections handled on these pages?
Each correction to published evidence is recorded with its date, what changed and why, and earlier versions remain traceable, so readers can see how evidence evolved.
Why publish corrections openly?
Because others may have relied on the earlier result. A visible correction lets them check whether their conclusions still hold.
Is assurance the same as audit?
Audit is one form of assurance. Model validation, peer review and independent challenge are others.
Can the platform provide assurance on my risk management?
No. It does not audit, validate or certify any organisation’s risk management.
ReportsContribute

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Reports is the Consortium’s quarterly publication. What you know about this subject can become evidence, a case or a correction in the next edition, credited to you and published under CC BY 4.0 where it is your own work.

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