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GCRI · Systems Science and Modelling

Networks and cascades

Many systemic risks travel along networks: supply chains, power grids, financial exposures, transport and contact networks. Network models represent who is connected to whom and simulate how a failure or infection spreads. This page sets out how networks are built and analysed, how cascade models work and fail, and what evidence serves the institutions that use network analysis to manage interconnected risk.

01Canvas

How the work runs.

Systems · around this subjectIllustrative

Coupled model runner

Networks and cascades · Coupled model A · Scenario set 3

Ensemble runningGCRI · Systems Science and Modelling

Model coupling graph

nodes: models · edges: exchanged variables

Coupled components

Hydrology1 dayrunoffYes
Power system1 hdemand, outagesYes
Economy1 quarteroutput, pricesPartial
Population1 yearexposureYes

Ensemble output

Coupled model runner: the screen’s structure, terms and states for Networks and cascades.Example names and illustrative values; a design, not a record or a live system.

Fig.Coupled model runner: example names and illustrative values, not a record or a live system.

02The question

Networks and cascades: how the risk develops.

Network science for dependency, contagion and cascading failure. The dossier below sets out how the risk develops, what is measured, where the data come from, how it is modelled and who decides.

Mechanism

Structure shapes spread

Highly connected nodes, short paths and clusters determine how fast and far a cascade travels. The same shock spreads differently on different structures.

Mechanism

Thresholds and load matter

Nodes fail when stress exceeds a threshold, and failed nodes shift load to neighbours, which can trigger further failures.

Mechanism

Missing links distort results

Real networks are rarely fully observed. Missing links can make a system look more or less fragile than it is.

Mechanism

Networks are layered

Real systems form multilayer networks, such as power and communications, where failures jump between the layers.

03Geography

Hazards and exposure in North America.

Population density, flood water and night lights over North America, from NASA GIBS. Each layer carries its own date.

The interactive map needs JavaScript; the layer list and sources are below.

Layers 3

Hazards and exposure, for this page

About this layer
Evidence
Estimated
Source
Gridded Population of the World v4.11 (NASA SEDAC (CIESIN, Columbia University))
Provider
NASA SEDAC (CIESIN, Columbia University)
Licence
CC BY 4.0
Vintage
null; Census-based estimate, static (2020)
Resolution
about 1 km grid
Uncertainty
Census-based estimate of people per square kilometre in 2020, shown as exposure context; not a count of people affected by any hazard.
Reached through
gibs.earthdata.nasa.gov, only after you allow the live map
About this layer
Evidence
Observed (clouds leave gaps)
Source
VIIRS Global Flood Product (NASA LANCE)
Provider
NASA LANCE
Licence
NASA open data
Vintage
daily; Satellite detection; clouds leave gaps
Newest at build
2026-10-14
Resolution
about 250 m grid
Uncertainty
Satellite detection; clouds leave gaps. Satellite or model raster as the provider publishes it. Clouds, swath gaps and retrieval error leave gaps and noise; values are indicators, not measurements at a place.
Reached through
gibs.earthdata.nasa.gov, only after you allow the live map
About this layer
Evidence
Observed
Source
VIIRS Black Marble (VNP46A2) (NASA LAADS DAAC)
Provider
NASA LAADS DAAC
Licence
NASA open data
Vintage
daily; Satellite radiance, corrected for moonlight and atmosphere
Newest at build
2026-10-12
Resolution
about 500 m grid
Uncertainty
Satellite night-time radiance for the date shown; lights are a proxy for electricity use and outages, not a measurement of supply or access.
Reached through
gibs.earthdata.nasa.gov, only after you allow the live map
About this layer
Evidence
Observed
Source
VIIRS NOAA-20 corrected reflectance (NASA LANCE)
Provider
NASA LANCE
Licence
NASA open data
Vintage
daily; Satellite image
Newest at build
2026-10-14
Resolution
about 250 m grid
Uncertainty
Satellite image. Satellite or model raster as the provider publishes it. Clouds, swath gaps and retrieval error leave gaps and noise; values are indicators, not measurements at a place.
Reached through
gibs.earthdata.nasa.gov, only after you allow the live map
About this layer
Evidence
Observed (clouds and overpass timing leave gaps)
Source
VIIRS NOAA-20 375 m (FIRMS) (NASA LANCE FIRMS)
Provider
NASA LANCE FIRMS
Licence
NASA open data
Vintage
daily; Satellite detection; clouds and overpass timing leave gaps
Newest at build
2026-10-13
Resolution
about 500 m grid
Uncertainty
Satellite hot-spot detections for the day shown, including gas flares and industrial heat; not a confirmed fire, an incident report or a warning.
Reached through
gibs.earthdata.nasa.gov, only after you allow the live map
About this layer
Evidence
Modelled (latest year GIBS publishes)
Source
MODIS Terra and Aqua land cover (MCD12Q1) (NASA LP DAAC)
Provider
NASA LP DAAC
Licence
NASA open data
Vintage
yearly; Satellite classification; latest year GIBS publishes
Newest at build
2024-01-01
Resolution
about 500 m grid
Uncertainty
Satellite land cover classes for the year shown, including croplands; a classification with known errors, not a farm register.
Reached through
gibs.earthdata.nasa.gov, only after you allow the live map

Latest available

NASA GIBS / EOSDIS · ASTER GDEM (METI, NASA) · Blue Marble (NASA) · © OpenStreetMap contributors (ODbL) · Natural Earth

Loading the latest NASA imagery.

Drag to move. Ctrl or ⌘ and scroll, pinch or the buttons to zoom; hover for the values under the pointer; reset returns to the region.

Hazards and exposure, framed on North America.Satellite and model products as NASA publishes them, each with its own date. They are indicators, not assessments of any place.

Data: NASA GIBS · ASTER GDEM · Blue Marble · © OpenStreetMap contributors · Natural Earth · NASA EONET · U.S. Geological Survey · NASA JPL OPERA DIST-ALERTSources and licences

  • We acknowledge the use of imagery provided by services from NASA’s Global Imagery Browse Services (GIBS), part of NASA’s Earth Science Data and Information System (ESDIS). Colours redrawn from the published colour map; values averaged into hexagonal cells where shown (modified). NASA open data
  • We acknowledge the use of imagery provided by services from NASA’s Global Imagery Browse Services (GIBS), part of NASA’s Earth Science Data and Information System (ESDIS). Colours redrawn from the published colour map; values averaged into hexagonal cells where shown (modified). NASA open data
  • Center for International Earth Science Information Network (CIESIN), Columbia University. 2018. Gridded Population of the World, Version 4 (GPWv4): Population Density, Revision 11. NASA Socioeconomic Data and Applications Center (SEDAC). Licensed under CC BY 4.0. Colours redrawn from the published colour map; values averaged into hexagonal cells where shown (modified). doi:10.7927/H49C6VHW. CC BY 4.0
  • VIIRS near-real-time products (flood, land surface temperature, snow cover, corrected reflectance), NASA LANCE; imagery via NASA GIBS. Colours redrawn from the published colour map; values averaged into hexagonal cells where shown (modified). NASA open data
  • VIIRS Black Marble night-time lights, NASA Goddard Space Flight Center; distributed by the NASA Level-1 and Atmosphere Archive and Distribution System (LAADS DAAC); imagery via NASA GIBS. Colours redrawn from the published colour map; values averaged into hexagonal cells where shown (modified). NASA open data
  • NASA Fire Information for Resource Management System (FIRMS), VIIRS 375 m active fire product, NASA LANCE; vector tiles via NASA GIBS. Colours redrawn from the published colour map; values averaged into hexagonal cells where shown (modified). NASA open data
  • MODIS land products (vegetation indices, gross primary production, land cover), NASA LP DAAC and LANCE; imagery via NASA GIBS. Colours redrawn from the published colour map; values averaged into hexagonal cells where shown (modified). NASA open data
  • ASTER GDEM is a product of METI and NASA (ASTER Global Digital Elevation Model V003, NASA LP DAAC); imagery via NASA GIBS. Colours redrawn from the published colour map; values averaged into hexagonal cells where shown (modified). Cite as: NASA/METI/AIST/Japan Spacesystems and U.S./Japan ASTER Science Team (2019). ASTER Global Digital Elevation Model V003. doi:10.5067/ASTER/ASTGTM.003. NASA open data
  • Made with Natural Earth. Free vector and raster map data @ naturalearthdata.com. Public domain
  • © OpenStreetMap contributors (ODbL), via NASA GIBS (coastlines, boundaries, roads and place names). Colours redrawn from the published colour map; values averaged into hexagonal cells where shown (modified). ODbL
  • Blue Marble, NASA Earth Observatory; imagery via NASA GIBS. Colours redrawn from the published colour map; values averaged into hexagonal cells where shown (modified). NASA open data
  • Context on the globe and flat map: coastlines, boundaries, roads and place names from NASA GIBS reference layers (OpenStreetMap data, ODbL, © OpenStreetMap contributors); Blue Marble imagery as an optional base; 3D terrain and the elevation read-out from the ASTER GDEM elevation colour index (5 m to 200 m classes, exaggerated for legibility). Boundaries are drawn as published and imply no position on any territory.
  • Live events: NASA Earth Observatory Natural Event Tracker (EONET); events are indicative and keep their original source links.
  • Live: NASA EONET Events are indicative, not authority warnings.
  • Live: U.S. Geological Survey Events are indicative, not authority warnings.
  • Observed (EO): NASA JPL OPERA DIST-ALERT (contains modified Copernicus Sentinel data 2026). We acknowledge the use of imagery provided by services from NASA’s Global Imagery Browse Services (GIBS), part of NASA’s Earth Science Data and Information System (ESDIS).
  • NASA GIBS: We acknowledge the use of imagery provided by services from NASA’s Global Imagery Browse Services (GIBS), part of NASA’s Earth Science Data and Information System (ESDIS).
  • River discharge forecast, 30 days with range (GloFAS via Open-Meteo): Contains modified Copernicus Emergency Management Service information 2026; not a flood warning.
  • Weather data by Open-Meteo.com (https://open-meteo.com/), licensed under CC BY 4.0 (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
  • Optional layers (11 sources in the layer list: live, forecast, observed and context) print their provider credit on the map and here when switched on; forecasts are model output and derived indices are estimates.

Layers and dates

  • Population density, 2020: Population: CIESIN, Columbia University, Gridded Population of the World v4.11 (2018), NASA SEDAC, CC BY 4.0 · static
  • Flood water, 3-day composite: VIIRS Global Flood Product, NASA LANCE · 14 Oct 2026
  • Night-time lights, daily: VIIRS Black Marble (VNP46A2), NASA LAADS DAAC · 12 Oct 2026
  • True colour: VIIRS NOAA-20 corrected reflectance, NASA LANCE · 13 Oct 2026
  • Active fires and thermal anomalies: VIIRS NOAA-20 375 m (FIRMS), NASA LANCE FIRMS · 13 Oct 2026
  • Land cover type (IGBP), yearly: MODIS Terra and Aqua land cover (MCD12Q1), NASA LP DAAC · 2024

04Across the domains

Network models trace cascades across domains.

Network studies are designed for the Global Systems Risk and Resilience series. Buldyrev and colleagues (2010) showed abrupt collapse in coupled networks; real systems have operators and buffers the theory omits.

  • Network datasets under terms.
  • Cascade case studies.
05Twin and cascade simulator

Model networks and cascades as a system. Run the cascade.

Assembled from the Nexus Standards area profile Compound and cascading hazard standards: the hazards it names, the systems and sectors that carry the loss, the controls that dampen it and the data that observe it. Choose the components, pick an initiating hazard and step through the cascade. The Map view places the run on an example geography with open data. Every coupling weight is a stated assumption you can change. A teaching model, not a forecast, an assessment or a certification. To model a place of your own choosing, open the full System Builder.

Hazards

Controls

  • NS-0 Constitution and principles
  • NS-3 Risk record UNIs (grammar, legacy crosswalk, allocation authority)
  • NS-9 Contextual UNIs (deployments, instances, programme instances)
  • NS-11 Verification and monitoring (evidence, attestations, zero-trust conformance observation)
  • NRS-H61 Hazard family: Cascading failure (NHS-1 sys.cascade)
  • NRS-H62 Hazard family: Compound and multi-hazard events (NHS-1 sys.compound)
  • NRS-H60 Hazard family: Supply-chain and flow disruption (NHS-1 sys.supply-chain)
  • NRS-H94 Hazard family: Systemic cyber events (NHS-1 cyber.systemic-cyber)
  • NRS-H107 Hazard family: Digital infrastructure concentration and monoculture (NHS-1 tech.digital-concentration)
  • NRS-H7 Hazard family: Large-scale circulation anomalies (NHS-1 atmo.climate-mode)

Observation

  • Copernicus EMS rapid mapping activations (listed for reference)
  • OpenStreetMap planet and replication (listed for reference)
  • ERA5 reanalysis (Copernicus Climate Data Store) (listed for reference)
  • Direct economic loss attributed to disasters in relation to global GDP
  • Number of disruptions to basic services attributed to disasters

Example geography

  • Bangladesh: 134 hexagonal cells
  • Night lights tonight, outages (VIIRS Day/Night Band), NASA GIBS
  • Carbon monoxide, smoke transport (AIRS), NASA GIBS
  • Vegetation disturbance alerts, 30 m (OPERA DIST-ALERT), NASA GIBS
06Indicators

What is measured, and how well.

Each indicator carries its unit, its cadence, the kind of source behind it and the evidence label a value would carry. No values are shown: a programme supplies them under its own authority.

IndicatorUnitCadenceSource typeLabel
Network sizenodes and linksper datasetNetwork dataOBSERVED
Degree distributiondistribution shapeper datasetNetwork analysisESTIMATED
Centrality of key nodescentrality scoreper analysisNetwork analysisESTIMATED
Cascade size in simulationshare of nodes failedper scenarioCascade modelsMODELLED
Data completenessestimated share of links observedper datasetData assessmentESTIMATED
Interlayer dependenciescountper datasetMultilayer network dataDECLARED
07Methods and evidence

How networks and cascades is modelled, measured and tested.

The model, its assumptions, its data and its uncertainty, in the form a scientist or engineer would check. Structures follow published methods. The values drawn are illustrative, not findings.

Model, equations and assumptions

The model structure used for networks and cascades, the assumptions it makes and how each is tested.

Risk of element iRi = f(Hi, Ei, Vi, Ci)hazard, exposure, vulnerability and coping capacity
Expected annual lossEAL = ∑k pk · Lkover events k with annual probability pk
Coupled systemsxt+1 = A xt + B ut + εtA carries the couplings, u the shock, ε the error
AssumptionWhy it is madeHow it is tested
Hazard and exposure are independent within an eventKeeps the loss integral tractableCompare with a copula fit on joint records
Couplings are linear near the operating pointLets shocks propagate through APerturb beyond the linear range and compare
Vulnerability curves transfer between placesLocal curves are rarely availableValidate against observed losses where they exist
Inputs
versioned datasets with provenance
Outputs
distributions, never single numbers
Code
released with the model card and tests
Reproduction
same data, code, environment and seed
Standard risk and state-space formulations; the assumptions listed are typical of the method, stated for review, not results.
FAIR guiding principles · GO FAIR and FORCE11W3C PROV · World Wide Web ConsortiumGuidance on consistent treatment of uncertainties · IPCCCEOS Analysis Ready Data · Committee on Earth Observation Satellites
08Sources

Where the evidence comes from.

Named public datasets and institutional records, each with its licence class. Sources by agreement are used only under their terms and never republished.

SourceWhat it givesLicence class
Published network datasets such as SNAP and NetzschleuderBenchmark networks for methods testingOpen, licence per dataset
Input-output and trade networks (OECD ICIO, BACI)Economic dependency networksPublic, OECD terms; open, Etalab licence
Power grid network models for researchGrid topology datasetsLicence per dataset (to check)
NetworkX, igraph and graph-toolOpen-source network analysis softwareOpen source, BSD and GPL licences
Network science literature on cascadesModels and validation studiesLicence per publication
09Decisions

Who decides, and what the evidence serves.

Systems Science and Modelling prepares evidence. The decisions below are taken by the authorities named, under their own rules, and never by the platform.

Who decidesThe questionEvidence this page serves
Analysts across Nexus platformsWhich network methods suit their dependency dataConstruction guides; model comparisons
Regulators and operatorsHow to read network-based risk findingsSensitivity analyses
Data ownersWhich links most need to be observedMissing link sensitivity

Outputs this topic produces

  • Network construction guides for dependency data
  • Cascade model comparisons
  • Sensitivity analyses for missing links
  • Method notes for platforms using network analysis
10Core questions

What experts ask about networks.

  • Which nodes or links, if removed, would cause the largest disruption?
  • How does network structure, such as clustering or hubs, affect the spread of failures?
  • When do small shocks trigger large cascades?
  • How do interdependent networks, such as power and communications, amplify failures?
  • How can redundancy and modularity make networks more robust?
11Mechanisms and drivers

How cascades happen.

Network science has shown that many real networks have heterogeneous structures, with a few highly connected hubs. Such networks are robust to random failures but vulnerable to targeted loss of hubs. The same structure that makes them efficient makes them fragile in specific ways.

Cascades occur when a failure overloads neighbours, which then fail in turn. In power grids, a line failure shifts flow to other lines; in finance, a default imposes losses on creditors; in supply chains, a missing part halts downstream production. Whether a shock stays local or spreads depends on load, capacity and connectivity.

Interdependent networks add risk. Power systems depend on communications for control, which depend on power. Failures can bounce between networks, producing larger collapses than either network alone would suffer.

12Methods and data

Methods and their limits.

  1. 01

    Graph metrics

    Centrality, connectivity and clustering measures, using network science. They describe structure but not dynamics.

  2. 02

    Cascade models

    Simulating failure propagation with load-redistribution or threshold rules. Results depend on assumed rules.

  3. 03

    Interdependent network models

    Coupling networks to study cross-system failure. Data on real interdependencies are scarce.

  4. 04

    Robustness optimisation

    Designing redundancy, using optimisation. Trade-offs with cost and efficiency.

Network data are often incomplete or confidential, and stylised models may not capture operational detail.

14Where this page’s references

Where this page’s references lead.

The bodies and documents this page is read against. Status and editions change; each link goes to the issuing body.

15Questions

Questions and answers.

What is a cascade in network science?
A sequence of failures or adoptions that spreads from node to node along network links, often triggered by a small initial event.
What is a multilayer network?
A network with several types of links or several interconnected networks, such as power and communications, where nodes in one layer depend on another.
Why do missing links matter?
Because cascade size and critical nodes depend on structure, so incomplete data can lead to wrong conclusions about fragility.
Are hubs always a weakness?
They make networks efficient and robust to random failures, but vulnerable to targeted or correlated loss.
Can cascades be prevented?
Their likelihood and size can be reduced with redundancy, buffers and controlled separation, at a cost.
What data are needed?
Data on nodes, links and capacities. Such data are often confidential, which limits public analysis.
Do financial networks behave like power grids?
They share structural features, but mechanisms differ. Methods transfer with adaptation.
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