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Distributed technical capacity for systemic risk: how the work is organized across six regions

Systemic risk is global in pattern and local in consequence, so the expertise to read it has to sit close to the systems at risk. This page explains how distributed technical capacity is organized in the Nexus Consortium, from a single Competence Cell to six programme regions, and what is on record today.

As of
21 October 2026
Reading
15 minutes
Evidence
18 sources, cited in order
NEXUS TWIN · WF-1 · NETWORKSEED b5eaf049GCRI-MAIN.POST.1076834xyzSCHEMATIC · NETWORKST-01 · 0.216 0.447ST-02 · 0.752 0.476
WF-1 · network Schematic wireframe twin (network, decision under uncertainty). An illustration, not data.

Methods and evidence

Evidence
18 sources, cited in order and listed under References
Figures
4 figures
Data availability
Every chart's data is published as a table on this page.
Research
3.33% vs 0.68%
R&D spending as a share of GDP, North America and Latin America and the Caribbean, 20235
Offline
2.2 bn
people without internet access in 20256
Warning
119
countries reporting a multi-hazard early warning system in 20257
Hubs
15
planned regional hubs, none operating4

01What distributed technical capacity means in the programme

What distributed technical capacity means in the programme

Distributed technical capacity is the expert, data and computing capability that countries, institutions and communities hold close to the risks they face, organized so that it can be compared and combined across borders without being moved to a central owner. In the Nexus Consortium, the public-good programme of The Global Centre for Risk and Innovation (GCRI), The Global Risks Forum (GRF) and The Global Risks Alliance (GRA), this capacity is organized through each country's National Nexus programme and, above it, through six programme regions that compare evidence on shared systems 3.

An earlier version of this page described a "Nexus Grid" as a distributed capacity layer with nodes and technical rooms. That structure has no record in the programme. The capacity is real, but it lives in bodies that are on record: the National Working Groups, the Competence Cell as their atomic unit, the six domain response teams (CERTs), the planned regional hubs and the Consortium Secretariat 1,2,4. This page describes those bodies, region by region, and what each is not.

02Why capacity has to sit where the risk is

Why capacity has to sit where the risk is

Systemic risk is global in pattern and local in consequence. A drought, a grid failure or a cyber incident propagates through networks that cross sectors and borders, and interdependent networks are more fragile than isolated ones: a failure in one can cascade into the other, and past a threshold the joint system can collapse abruptly rather than degrade gradually, as the foundational study of cascades in interdependent networks showed 9. The people who can read those dependencies are usually the operators, researchers and agencies close to the system: the hydrologist who knows the basin, the engineer who knows the substation, the statistician who knows the gaps in the census. A central team can coordinate them; it cannot replace them.

The evidence on where capacity sits makes the point sharply. Research and development expenditure in the World Bank's indicators shows the spread. Research and development expenditure was 3.33% of GDP in North America and 2.78% in East Asia and the Pacific in 2023, against 0.68% in Latin America and the Caribbean in the same year and 0.63% in South Asia in 2020 5. On the researchers-per-million indicator, North America had about 5,009 researchers per million people in 2022, South Asia about 257 in 2020 10. Connectivity follows the same gradient. According to ITU's 2025 internet-use figures, 74% of the world's population used the internet in 2025, but 36% in Africa and 23% in low-income countries 11. A programme that assumed capacity was evenly spread would build for the countries that need it least.

Warning capacity shows both progress and gaps. According to the 2025 global status report on multi-hazard early warning, in 2025, 119 countries, or 60% of all countries, reported a multi-hazard early warning system, 113% more than ten years earlier; only 43% of small island developing States did 7. The global effort to close that gap, Early Warnings for All, is co-led by the World Meteorological Organization (WMO) and the UN Office for Disaster Risk Reduction (UNDRR) and aims for everyone on Earth to be covered by the end of 2027 12. Distributed technical capacity is what lets a country's own agencies use, test and improve such systems rather than depend on others to run them.

Fig. 01Research capacity is concentrated in three regions

Research capacity is concentrated in three regions Two horizontal bar charts by World Bank region. R&D spending as a share of GDP ranges from 3.33 per cent in North America to 0.44 per cent in Sub-Saharan Africa (2007). Researchers per million range from 5,009 in North America to 257 in South Asia. North America3.33 per cent of GDPEast Asia and Pacific2.78 per cent of GDPWorld2.6 per cent of GDPEurope and Central Asia2.14 per cent of GDPMENA, Afghanistan and Pakistan1.33 per cent of GDPLatin America and Caribbean0.68 per cent of GDPSouth Asia0.63 per cent of GDPSub-Saharan Africa0.44 per cent of GDP
World Bank regions differ from the six programme regions. Each bar shows the latest year with data; Sub-Saharan Africa has no regional researcher figure and its spending figure dates from 2007.5,10Sources: World Bank, World Development Indicators (UNESCO Institute for Statistics data), updated 8 October 2026. As of 21 October 2026.
Figure 1 in words, and its data

Left panel, research and development expenditure as a percentage of GDP, latest year with data: North America 3.33 (2023), East Asia and Pacific 2.78 (2023), World 2.60 (2023), Europe and Central Asia 2.14 (2023), Middle East, North Africa, Afghanistan and Pakistan 1.33 (2021), Latin America and Caribbean 0.68 (2023), South Asia 0.63 (2020), Sub-Saharan Africa 0.44 (2007). Right panel, researchers in research and development per million people: North America 5,009 (2022), Europe and Central Asia 3,715 (2023), East Asia and Pacific 2,426 (2023), World 1,652 (2020), Middle East, North Africa, Afghanistan and Pakistan 858 (2021), Latin America and Caribbean 583 (2014), South Asia 257 (2020); no figure for Sub-Saharan Africa.

World Bank regionR&D spending, % of GDP (year)Researchers per million (year)
North America3.33 (2023) 55,009 (2022) 10
East Asia and Pacific2.78 (2023) 52,426 (2023) 10
Europe and Central Asia2.14 (2023) 53,715 (2023) 10
Middle East, North Africa, Afghanistan and Pakistan1.33 (2021) 5858 (2021) 10
Latin America and Caribbean0.68 (2023) 5583 (2014) 10
South Asia0.63 (2020) 5257 (2020) 10
Sub-Saharan Africa0.44 (2007) 5No regional figure 10
World2.60 (2023) 51,652 (2020) 10
Data of Figure 1. Research capacity by World Bank region, latest year with data 5,10.

03From one cell to one programme

From one cell to one programme

The programme organizes capacity in four layers, and each layer does only what the one below it cannot. At the base is the Competence Cell: a small team with a stated competence, a host, a lead and a review route. A cell is formed at one of three levels: by an institution such as a university, an institute, an operator or a professional body; by a community, Indigenous or place-based institution; or by a public agency within its own mandate 2. A hydrology modelling cell at a university, a grid-reliability cell at a utility, a coastal observation cell run by a community and a data-stewardship cell at a statistical office are all examples of the form.

Cells work inside the National Working Groups (NWG), which do the expert work of a National Nexus programme. Experts, practitioners, students and volunteers take bounded, supervised assignments with stated prerequisites, review points and closure criteria; assignments follow competence, and ordinary participation has no fee 1. Every assignment passes through five steps: an open work call, a check of competence and availability, a bounded assignment with a supervisor, a contribution record and review, and recognition with a next assignment 2. Typical assignments are source qualification and data stewardship, mapping and geospatial analysis, model building for the National Model, evidence review, exercise support and drafting sections of country editions of Reports.

Six domain response teams, the CERTs, sit under the working groups, each made of one or more cells recorded for the domain. A cell with the right competence and readiness can be recorded as one of them. The CERTs support preparedness, observation, verification, mapping, exercises, evidence and learning; they are not emergency services, incident command or privileged network-access teams, and they issue no warnings, because only the competent public authority may warn, alert or command 2.

Above the national layer, a Regional Nexus Consortium compares compatible evidence on systems that cross borders, and the Consortium Secretariat, held by GCRI through GCRI Canada in Toronto, keeps the programme's records and routes enquiries 4. The rule that binds the layers is subsidiarity: a level takes up a question only when it cannot be settled below it 4.

Fig. 02Distributed capacity, from one cell to one programme

Distributed capacity, from one cell to one programme Four stacked bands. The atomic unit: a Competence Cell formed by an institution, a community or an agency, which can serve as a CERT. National: the NNC, NLC and NWG. Regional: six regions and fifteen planned hubs. Global: the Secretariat in Toronto, GCRI, GRF and GRA. A side panel places the decision outside. 01GlobalSecretariat, GCRI, GRF, GRA02RegionalSix regions, fifteen planned hubs03NationalNNC, NLC, NWG04CellInstitution, community, agency
Four layers, each taking up only what the layer below cannot settle; the decision stays with the competent authority outside the programme.1,2,4Sources: GCRI, Working groups; Nexus documentation, NWG and Regions and hubs. As of 21 October 2026.
Figure 2 in words

A layered diagram read from the bottom up. The atomic unit is the Competence Cell, a small team with a stated competence, a host, a lead and a review route, formed at institution level (for example a modelling cell at a university or utility), community level (a local observation cell for a river or coast) or agency level (a data cell within a public mandate); a cell can be recorded as one of six CERTs, which are never emergency services. The national layer is the country's own programme with its Desk, Model and Portfolio and three participation pillars: the NNC for institutions, the NLC for leaders in personal capacity and the NWG for bounded, supervised expert assignments. The regional layer has six regions, all in formation, fifteen planned hubs that are coordination roles and none operating, and regional consortiums that publish profiles in the second and fourth quarters and hold no authority over a country. The global layer has the Consortium Secretariat at GCRI Canada in Toronto, GCRI for methods and evidence, GRF for leadership and Nexus Universe, and GRA for finance and insurance readiness. An arrow marks subsidiarity; a side panel states that decisions are taken by the competent authority, operator or financial institution outside the programme.

04Six regions and fifteen planned hubs

Six regions and fifteen planned hubs

Regions in the programme describe relationships, not territory. They exist because many of the largest risks travel through shared infrastructure and ecosystems, and they compare evidence "with compatible methods, without merging national data or authority" 3,4. North African states take part in both the Africa and the Middle East and North Africa programmes, and Mexico in both North America and Latin America and the Caribbean 4. The cross-border risk systems page sets the rule for all regional work: it compares governed outputs and preserves dissent, and it creates no treaty, no transfer of sovereignty and no right to move data 13.

Each region has planned hubs: coordination roles for a group of countries, which operate only once a host decision is on record. A planned hub is never an office or an exclusive territory, and today none is operating 4. The table sets out the record.

RegionPlanned hubsFocus of the planned hubs
AfricaSenegal, Kenya, South AfricaSahel and coastal dependencies; drought, pastoral systems and ports; water, energy and mining dependencies
Asia and the PacificIndia, Singapore, JapanMonsoon, heat and river systems; import dependencies and ports; seismic and tsunami resilience and supply chains
Europe and EurasiaUnited Kingdom, France, Switzerland, TürkiyeNorth Sea and coastal systems; Mediterranean systems and grids; Alpine watersheds and methods; seismic resilience and corridors
Latin America and the CaribbeanBrazilAmazon and basin systems, biodiversity, food, energy and bioeconomy
Middle East and North AfricaUnited Arab Emirates, Saudi ArabiaHeat, desalination, power and compute; water, cities and Red Sea dependencies
North AmericaCanada, United StatesNational adaptation, Arctic interfaces and coordination; power, digital infrastructure and supply chains
The six programme regions, their planned hubs and the focus of each hub, as recorded on 21 October 2026. Every region is in formation and no hub is operating 3,4.

Fig. 03Six regions, fifteen planned hubs, one recorded seat

Six regions, fifteen planned hubs, one recorded seat World map in Equal Earth projection with countries shaded by their six programme regions, North Africa and Mexico hatched as members of two regions, fifteen planned hub markers from Senegal to Japan, and a diamond marking the Consortium Secretariat in Toronto. SixregionsAfrica3 planned hubsAsia-Pacific3 planned hubsEurope and Eurasia4 planned hubsLatin America andCaribbean1 planned hubMiddle East andNorth Africa2 planned hubsNorth America2 planned hubs
Hub markers show the planned host country of each coordination role; hatched countries take part in two regions. No hub is operating, and a hub is never an office or an exclusive territory.3,4Sources: Nexus Consortium model as published by GCRI; Natural Earth. As of 21 October 2026.
Figure 3 in words

A world map on Natural Earth geometry. Countries are shaded by programme region: Africa (planned hubs Senegal, Kenya and South Africa), Asia and the Pacific (India, Singapore and Japan), Europe and Eurasia (United Kingdom, France, Switzerland and Türkiye), Latin America and the Caribbean (Brazil), Middle East and North Africa (United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia) and North America (Canada and the United States). North African states are hatched because they take part in both Africa and the Middle East and North Africa; Mexico is hatched for North America and Latin America and the Caribbean. A black diamond marks Toronto, the recorded seat of the Consortium Secretariat. All regions are in formation and no hub is operating.

05Distributed technical capacity, region by region

Distributed technical capacity, region by region

Africa. The programme is designed around transboundary river basins, regional power pools, trade and mineral corridors, food and pastoral systems and cross-border health 3. Capacity is thinnest here on every public measure: the most recent regional figure for research spending in Sub-Saharan Africa, 0.44% of GDP, dates from 2007, and the World Bank publishes no regional figure for researchers per million 5,10. Internet use in the World Bank's regional series was 35.7% in Sub-Saharan Africa in 2025 14. Early warning is where progress is fastest: the comprehensiveness of African warning systems rose 72% since 2015, though the region still has the lowest scores 7. The case for cells hosted by national meteorological services, universities and community institutions is strongest where the gap is widest.

Asia and the Pacific. The region holds the densest manufacturing and logistics networks, the largest monsoon and glacier-fed basins and Pacific island states exposed to compound climate and connectivity risk 3. Its capacity is deep but concentrated: East Asia and the Pacific spent 2.78% of GDP on research in 2023, South Asia 0.63% in 2020 5. Island states face the double gap the warning data show, with 43% of small island developing States reporting a multi-hazard system 7.

Europe and Eurasia. Interconnected power, gas, data and transport systems make cascading infrastructure failure the defining regional question 3. Europe and Central Asia had about 3,715 researchers per million people in 2023 and internet use of 92.4% in 2025 10,14. The capacity question here is less whether expertise exists than whether it can be made comparable across many jurisdictions without merging their data.

Latin America and the Caribbean. Amazon and Andean water systems, canal and port continuity, hurricane and seismic exposure and agricultural export corridors set the agenda 3. Research spending was 0.68% of GDP in 2023, and the latest regional researcher count, about 583 per million, dates from 2014 5,10. A stale figure is itself a finding: it marks where national statistical capacity, not only research capacity, needs support.

Middle East and North Africa. Water scarcity and desalination, the energy transition, extreme heat and strategic maritime corridors are the shared systems 3. The World Bank's regional aggregate for the Middle East, North Africa, Afghanistan and Pakistan shows research spending of 1.33% of GDP and about 858 researchers per million in 2021 5,10. Planned hubs in the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia list compute among their focus areas, which turns capacity into a question of power and water as well as people 4.

North America. Integrated grids, continental supply chains, shared waters and wildfire smoke tie Canada, the United States and Mexico together, and the Secretariat seat is in Toronto 3,4. North America has the highest research intensity on both measures: 3.33% of GDP in 2023 and about 5,009 researchers per million in 2022 5,10. Its emerging capacity question is compute: according to the US Department of Energy's data-centre report, US data centres used about 176 TWh in 2023, about 4.4% of US electricity, and could use 6.7% to 12% by 2028 15.

Fig. 04Capacity to connect, and capacity to warn

Capacity to connect, and capacity to warn Bar chart of internet use in 2025: world 74 per cent, high-income countries 94, Asia-Pacific 77, Arab States 70, Africa 36, least developed countries 34 and low-income countries 23, with the Americas, CIS and Europe at 88 to 93. A side panel: 119 countries report early warning, up 113 per cent, and 43 per cent of SIDS. World74 per cent of populationHigh-income94 per cent of populationAsia-Pacific77 per cent of populationArab States70 per cent of populationAfrica36 per cent of populationLDCs34 per cent of populationLow-income23 per cent of population
ITU regions and income groups differ from the programme regions; ITU publishes a combined 88 to 93% for the Americas, CIS and Europe. Warning figures are country counts from the 2025 global status report.11,6,7Sources: ITU, Facts and Figures 2025; WMO and UNDRR, Global Status of Multi-Hazard Early Warning Systems 2025. As of 21 October 2026.
Figure 4 in words, and its data

Left, horizontal bars of the share of the population using the internet in 2025, by ITU region and income group: World 74 per cent; high-income countries 94; Asia-Pacific 77; Arab States 70; Africa 36; least developed countries 34; low-income countries 23; the Americas, CIS and Europe between 88 and 93 per cent as a combined range. Right, a panel on multi-hazard early warning in 2025: 119 countries, 60 per cent of all countries, report a multi-hazard early warning system; 113 per cent more countries than ten years earlier; 43 per cent of small island developing States report one.

MeasureValueSource
Internet use, world74% 11ITU
High-income countries94% 11ITU
Asia-Pacific77% 11ITU
Arab States70% 11ITU
Africa36% 11ITU
Least developed countries34% 11ITU
Low-income countries23% 11ITU
Americas, CIS and Europe (combined)88 to 93% 11ITU
Countries reporting a multi-hazard early warning system119, or 60% of all countries 7WMO and UNDRR
Change over ten years+113% 7WMO and UNDRR
Small island developing States reporting one43% 7WMO and UNDRR
Data of Figure 4. Internet use in 2025 and early warning coverage 11,7.

06Compute, networks and contributed infrastructure

Compute, networks and contributed infrastructure

Technical capacity is also machines: computing, storage and networks. In the programme's architecture these are carried by systems with their own public names, NXS-COR (compute, nodes and runtimes) and NXS-NET (network topology and continuity), with NXS-EWS (multi-hazard monitoring and warning) for the warning chain. "Compute under national control" is design intent subject to evidence, not a description of an installed environment; the twenty systems are documented as designs with their limits.

The model keeps offers and allocations apart. An infrastructure offer is not an allocation, and contributed data, compute, people and facilities count only once they have been measured and accepted 16,8. The programme offering for national data, compute and AI capability states the same boundary: a blueprint is not an installed environment, and requested capacity is not allocated capacity 8. For providers, the route is technology and infrastructure providers; the specialist platform on data and compute carries the research questions, and the Network and Core gateway sets out the rules for describing capacity.

07How capacity is measured, and where the measures fail

How capacity is measured, and where the measures fail

The figures on this page come from the World Bank's World Development Indicators, which carry UNESCO Institute for Statistics data on research and ITU data on connectivity, from the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) itself, and from the WMO and UNDRR global status report on early warning 5,10,11,7. Three cautions apply. First, the World Bank and ITU regions differ from the six programme regions, so no figure here is a programme-region statistic. Second, the latest year differs by region, from 2023 back to 2007, and an old figure is shown with its year rather than silently mixed with current ones. Third, input measures such as spending and headcount describe potential capacity, not the ability to analyse a specific cascade; that is measured only when a question is tested.

The programme applies the same discipline to its own records. Every finding carries one of nine evidence labels, from observed to unknown; missing data is shown as missing, never as zero; and a capacity offer is never counted as reserved, consumed or funded 16,8. Participation states, from enquiry to accepted assignment, are kept in the programme's participation records, so that recognition follows the record rather than the claim.

08Standards and instruments for shared capacity

Standards and instruments for shared capacity

Capacity becomes comparable when it is described the same way. The Nexus Standards that govern this layer are proposed, not adopted, and each country decides whether and how to use them through its National Standards Council 17. They sit alongside instruments the countries already own.

InstrumentWhat it coversStatus
NRS-E6National and regional adoption and hubsProposed Nexus Risk Standard 18
NRS-E5Participation, councils and standingProposed Nexus Risk Standard 18
NS-1The UNI identifier and the artifact catalogue, used to cite records and outputsProposed foundation standard 17
Governance of the Nexus StandardsNo stakeholder group holds more than one third of a decision; funding never buys a seatProposed working model 17
Early Warnings for AllFour pillars from risk knowledge to preparedness; universal coverage by the end of 2027UN initiative, co-led by WMO and UNDRR 12
Selected standards and instruments relevant to distributed technical capacity, with status as of 21 October 2026.

09What is changing

What is changing

  • Compute becomes infrastructure. Data-centre demand is rising fast enough to become a grid and water question; in the United States it could reach 6.7% to 12% of electricity by 2028 15.
  • Connectivity is the floor. 2.2 billion people remain offline, which bounds what any distributed evidence system can reach 6.
  • Warning coverage is the test. The 2027 target for universal early warning turns local capacity into a measurable public good 12.
  • Stale statistics are a capacity gap. Where the latest regional research figure is from 2007 or 2014, statistical capacity is part of the problem to solve 5,10.

10Three institutions, one capacity architecture

Three institutions, one capacity architecture

GCRI supplies methods, tools and supervision standards to the working groups and runs the programme's technical office, including the Nexus Universe technical office that qualifies contributed capacity before an exercise 1. GRF convenes leadership and governs Nexus Universe, where national and regional capacity is tested once a year; its pages on regional cooperation, regional leadership and national and regional participation explain that side. GRA reads the same evidence for finance, insurance and development readiness through its regional programmes and the Consortium finance interface; readiness evidence is never a financing or underwriting decision 8.

11What institutions can do now

What institutions can do now

The programme is at service level R0, information and enquiries: enquiries receive a reference, and applications, payments, computing allocations and registrations open only when their service team, terms and review capacity exist 16,8. Within that limit, the routes are open.

What this page does not claim: "Nexus Grid" is not a programme structure, and no node, room or grid exists under that name. No Competence Cell, working group, CERT or hub is constituted or operating; every region is in formation and the service level is R0. A cell confers no authority, employment or licence, and a CERT is not an emergency service. GCRI does not regulate or certify, GRF does not regulate, finance or procure, and GRA does not lend, underwrite, rate or invest. Naming an agency, dataset or initiative is not a claim of partnership or endorsement.

Questions

Questions and answers

What happened to Nexus Grid?

The term described a distributed capacity layer that has no record in the programme. The capacity it described is organized through National Nexus, the National Working Groups and their Competence Cell units, six programme regions and fifteen planned hubs, all in formation.

Who can form a Competence Cell?

An institution such as a university, operator or professional body, a community or Indigenous institution, or a public agency within its own mandate. A cell keeps its host's rules and liabilities and is reviewed on method. Forming one confers no authority, employment or licence.

Is a planned hub an office of GCRI?

No. A planned hub is a coordination role for a group of countries. It is never an office or an exclusive territory, and it operates only once its host decision is on record. None is operating today.

Can my organization contribute computing or data capacity?

You can offer it through the technology and infrastructure providers route. An offer is recorded as an offer; it is never counted as reserved, allocated or funded until it has been qualified, measured and accepted for a specific mission.

Do regional bodies decide for countries?

No. Regional work compares compatible evidence on shared systems. It creates no treaty, transfer of sovereignty or right to move data, and every decision stays with the competent national authority, operator or financial institution.

Terms

Glossary

Competence Cell
The atomic unit of the NWG fabric: a small team with a stated competence, a host, a lead and a review route, formed at institution, community or agency level.
National Working Groups (NWG)
The expert delivery groups of a National Nexus programme, working through bounded, supervised assignments.
CERT
One of six domain response teams under the working groups, supporting preparedness, observation and exercises; never an emergency service.
Planned hub
A regional coordination role for a group of countries; it operates only once a host decision is on record.
Subsidiarity
The rule that a question is handled at the lowest level able to handle it.
Service level R0
The current state of the programme: information and enquiries, each enquiry with a durable reference.

Reuse and cite

Text CC BY 4.0. Cite the page with its date; data tables are linked under each figure.

Sources

References

18 sources, numbered in the order they are first cited
  1. The Global Centre for Risk and Innovation (2026-10). Working groups. therisk.global. Accessed 2026-10-21.
  2. Nexus documentation (docs.therisk.global) (2026-10-21). National Working Groups (NWG). docs.therisk.global. Accessed 2026-10-21.
  3. The Global Centre for Risk and Innovation (2026-10). Six programme regions. therisk.global. Accessed 2026-10-21.
  4. Nexus documentation (docs.therisk.global) (2026-10-21). Regions and hubs. docs.therisk.global. Accessed 2026-10-21.
  5. World Bank, World Development Indicators (UNESCO Institute for Statistics data) (2026-10-08). Research and development expenditure (% of GDP), regional aggregates. data.worldbank.org. Accessed 2026-10-21.
  6. International Telecommunication Union (2025-10). Facts and Figures 2025. www.itu.int. Accessed 2026-10-21.
  7. World Meteorological Organization and UN Office for Disaster Risk Reduction (2025-11-12). Early warning systems reach new heights, but critical gaps jeopardize global progress (Global Status of Multi-Hazard Early Warning Systems 2025). wmo.int. Accessed 2026-10-21.
  8. Nexus documentation (docs.therisk.global) (2026-10-21). Status and service levels. docs.therisk.global. Accessed 2026-10-21.
  9. Buldyrev, Parshani, Paul, Stanley and Havlin, Nature 464 (2010-04). Catastrophic cascade of failures in interdependent networks. www.nature.com. Accessed 2026-10-21.
  10. World Bank, World Development Indicators (UNESCO Institute for Statistics data) (2026-10-08). Researchers in R&D (per million people), regional aggregates. data.worldbank.org. Accessed 2026-10-21.
  11. International Telecommunication Union (2025-10-15). Facts and Figures 2025: Internet use. www.itu.int. Accessed 2026-10-21.
  12. World Meteorological Organization (2026). Early Warnings for All. wmo.int. Accessed 2026-10-21.
  13. The Global Centre for Risk and Innovation (2026-10). Cross-border risk systems. therisk.global. Accessed 2026-10-21.
  14. World Bank, World Development Indicators (ITU data) (2026-10-08). Individuals using the Internet (% of population), regional aggregates. data.worldbank.org. Accessed 2026-10-21.
  15. U.S. Department of Energy and Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory (2024-12-20). DOE releases new report evaluating increase in electricity demand from data centers. www.energy.gov. Accessed 2026-10-21.
  16. The Global Centre for Risk and Innovation (2026-10). Programme status. therisk.global. Accessed 2026-10-21.
  17. Nexus Standards (2026-10). Governance of the Nexus Standards. nexustandards.com. Accessed 2026-10-21.
  18. Nexus Standards (2026-10). NRS: Nexus Risk Standards. nexustandards.com. Accessed 2026-10-21.

Record

Editorial record

Facts and programme states are given as of 21 October 2026. This page replaces an earlier version that described "Nexus Grid" as a distributed capacity layer with grid nodes, technical rooms and Grid review; none of these has a record in the programme, and the page now describes the bodies that are on record. It is reviewed at least every 180 days and whenever a programme state, a hub host decision or a cited figure changes.

Published by the GCRI editorial desk under the scientific and editorial integrity policy. To report an error or request a correction, use corrections and concerns; corrections are dated and listed with the page. Programme states are kept in the claims and readiness register.

Cite this article

GCRI editorial desk (2026, June 8). Distributed technical capacity for systemic risk, by region. The Global Centre for Risk and Innovation. https://therisk.global/nexus-grid-distributed-technical-capacity-for-national-and-regional-systemic-risk-readiness/

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Republish or translate this article free of charge, in print or online, under CC BY 4.0: keep the byline and The Global Centre for Risk and Innovation, link to the original and note any change. Figures, maps and twins made by the institutions carry the same licence; third-party data keeps its own credit line.

Attribution to paste
<p>Distributed technical capacity for systemic risk: how the work is organized across six regions — GCRI editorial desk, The Global Centre for Risk and Innovation. First published 8 June 2026 at <a href="https://therisk.global/nexus-grid-distributed-technical-capacity-for-national-and-regional-systemic-risk-readiness/">https://therisk.global/nexus-grid-distributed-technical-capacity-for-national-and-regional-systemic-risk-readiness/</a>. Republished under CC BY 4.0 (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).</p>

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