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The UAE hub and the Gulf's shared risks: heat, water, power and the Strait of Hormuz

Six countries around the Gulf share one sea, one chokepoint and some of the hottest, most water-scarce conditions on Earth. This page explains the planned UAE hub of the Nexus Consortium, the systems it would examine, and why no GCC consortium or Dubai seat is on record.

As of
21 October 2026
Reading
14 minutes
Evidence
16 sources, cited in order
NEXUS TWIN · WF-1 · GLOBESEED 94fcece9GCRI-MAIN.POST.1077679xyzSCHEMATIC · GLOBEST-01 · 0.462 0.397ST-02 · 0.676 0.282
WF-1 · globe Schematic wireframe twin (globe, climate system). An illustration, not data.

Methods and evidence

Evidence
16 sources, cited in order and listed under References
Figures
5 figures
Data availability
Every chart's data is published as a table on this page.
Oil
20 m b/d
through the Strait of Hormuz in 2024, about 20% of world consumption4
Water
46%
of global online desalination capacity is in the Middle East and North Africa6
Heat
2x
the Arab region warms about twice as fast as the world7
Rain
259.5 mm
in 24 hours at Al Ain in April 20247

01What the UAE hub is

What the UAE hub is

The UAE hub is a planned regional coordination role of the Nexus Consortium for six countries around the Gulf: the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar and Iran. It sits in the Middle East and North Africa programme region, one of six programme regions, beside a planned Saudi Arabia hub that covers thirteen countries from the Levant to the Maghreb. Its recorded focus is heat, desalination, power, compute, ports, logistics and development readiness 1.

A planned hub is a coordination role, not an office, a public authority or an exclusive territory. It operates only once its host decision is on record, and none is: the region is in formation, no host and no named programme are recorded, and the programme's current service level is R0, information and enquiries 1,3. This page replaces an earlier one that described a "GCC Nexus Consortium" anchored in Dubai by 2030, with Abu Dhabi as a sovereign-capital node and Saudi Arabia among its members. None of that is on record. The cluster that the programme model actually defines follows the Gulf's shared systems rather than the membership of the Gulf Cooperation Council: it includes Iran, on the far shore of the same strait, and leaves Saudi Arabia to the Saudi Arabia hub, whose Riyadh page explains its own cluster.

For a ministry in Muscat, a utility in Kuwait or a port authority in Dubai, that difference is practical. An enquiry reaches a programme that can route a question to a regional desk and keep a durable record of it; it does not reach a body that can commission work, represent a government or speak for the Council. The regions and hubs page of the documentation sets out the rule, and the status and service levels page explains how a state changes only when the record behind it does.

02Why the Gulf needs shared risk evidence

Why the Gulf needs shared risk evidence

The six countries of the cluster share a sea, a climate and a chokepoint, and their risks travel along all three. The World Meteorological Organization found that 2024 was the hottest year on record for the Arab region, 1.08 °C above the 1991 to 2020 average, and that the region warmed about 0.43 °C per decade from 1991 to 2024, roughly twice the global rate of about 0.2 °C (WMO and ESCWA) 7,8. Temperatures passed 50 °C in Bahrain, Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and the UAE in 2024, straining power grids 7. Peer-reviewed projections find that, under business-as-usual emissions, wet-bulb temperatures around the Gulf are likely to approach and exceed 35 °C, the limit beyond which a healthy person cannot shed heat outdoors 9.

Heat is not the only hazard. From 14 to 17 April 2024 the UAE had its most significant rainfall event in recent decades: 259.5 mm fell in 24 hours at Khatam Al-Shakla in Al Ain, and Dubai received 142 mm on 16 April, close to its typical annual total of 140 to 200 mm 7. Four people died in the UAE, insured losses were estimated at USD 2.9 to 3.4 billion, and in Oman flash floods on 14 April killed 20 people 7. A region planned around scarcity met excess, and its streets, transport networks and infrastructure failed together.

Underneath both hazards lies water. Fifteen of the world's 20 most water-scarce countries are in the Arab region, which has about 5% of the world's population and less than 2% of its renewable freshwater 7. Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman and Qatar are among the six most water-stressed countries in the world, and 83% of the population of the Middle East and North Africa is exposed to extremely high water stress 10. Kuwait, Qatar and the UAE each have less than 100 cubic metres of internal renewable water per person, which is why desalination is not an option for them but the base of supply 6.

Fig. 01One strait, six countries, global exposure

One strait, six countries, global exposure Map of the Gulf with the six countries of the planned UAE hub cluster highlighted: the UAE, Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar and Iran, with Saudi Arabia shaded as a separate planned hub and callouts on the Strait of Hormuz for oil, trade and container traffic. United Arab EmiratesCountries in focus
Cluster colours show coordination groupings in the programme model, not territory or jurisdiction; Dubai is marked for orientation only.1,4,5Sources: GCRI, Middle East and North Africa region; US EIA; UNCTAD; Natural Earth. As of 21 October 2026.
Figure 1 in words

A Lambert conformal map of the Gulf. Gold: the UAE hub cluster, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar and Iran. Grey-blue: Saudi Arabia and the countries of the Saudi Arabia hub. A dashed circle marks the Strait of Hormuz. Callouts: about 20 million barrels a day of oil through the strait in 2024, about 20% of world petroleum liquids consumption; 11% of global maritime trade by weight, 34% of seaborne oil exports and 30% of LPG exports; more than 30 million TEU of container port traffic near the strait, much of it transhipment at Jebel Ali, Dubai. A legend states that hubs are coordination roles and none is operating.

03Why coupling changes the question

Why coupling changes the question

In the Gulf, water, power and trade are one system. The Middle East and North Africa held 46% of the world's online desalination capacity in 2025, and the UAE alone operated 9.1 million cubic metres a day, the fourth largest fleet in the world 6. Energy accounts for 37% to 75% of desalination operating cost, and capacity across the GCC is expected to grow by 75% between 2020 and 2030 6. A heatwave therefore raises cooling demand on the same grid that runs the plants that supply drinking water, at the moment both are most needed.

The grids themselves are coupled. Since 2009 the GCC Interconnection Authority has joined the power systems of the UAE, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Oman, Qatar and Kuwait into a single network 11. That interconnection is a source of resilience, because one system can support another, and a channel of contagion, because a disturbance can propagate. Which it becomes in a given event is an empirical question that needs data from several operators at once.

Trade adds a global layer. According to the US Energy Information Administration, oil flows through the Strait of Hormuz averaged about 20 million barrels a day in 2024, about 20% of world petroleum liquids consumption, and the strait carried about a fifth of global trade in liquefied natural gas, mostly from Qatar 4. UNCTAD finds that the strait carries 11% of global maritime trade by weight, 34% of seaborne oil exports and 30% of liquefied petroleum gas exports, with an average of 144 ship transits a day in mid-June 2025 5. More than 30 million TEU of container traffic is handled near the strait, much of it transhipment at Jebel Ali in Dubai 5. Bypass pipelines could carry only about 2.6 million barrels a day in a disruption 4.

Fig. 03A year of rain in a day

A year of rain in a day Four boxes in sequence: 259.5 mm of rain in 24 hours at Khatam Al-Shakla in Al Ain in April 2024; 142 mm in Dubai on 16 April, close to a typical year's rainfall; four deaths in the UAE and 20 in Oman; and estimated insured losses of 2.9 to 3.4 billion US dollars. HAZARD259.5 mmCITY142 mmPEOPLE4 deathsLOSSESUS$2.9 to 3.4 bn
Each box is a separately reported effect; the arrows show the order of the cascade, not a modelled causal weight.7Sources: WMO, State of the Climate in the Arab Region 2024. As of 21 October 2026.
Figure 3 in words

Box one, hazard: 259.5 mm in 24 hours at Khatam Al-Shakla, Al Ain, during the event of 14 to 17 April 2024. Box two, city: 142 mm in Dubai on 16 April, close to the typical annual rainfall of 140 to 200 mm. Box three, people: four deaths in the UAE; 20 died in flash floods in Oman on 14 April. Box four, losses: insured losses estimated at 2.9 to 3.4 billion US dollars; transport networks and key infrastructure disrupted.

04Five shared systems the region examines

Five shared systems the region examines

Regional work starts from shared systems, not from institutions. The Middle East and North Africa programme names five, each with the question it examines 1. The cross-border risk systems page sets the rule for all of them: shared-system work compares governed outputs and preserves dissent; it creates no treaty, no transfer of sovereignty and no right to move data 12.

Shared systemThe question it examinesWhy it matters to the UAE cluster
Water scarcity and desalinationHow do groundwater depletion, desalination capacity and energy supply interact under prolonged heat and drought?The region holds 46% of global online desalination capacity 6
Energy transitionWhich grid, storage and export dependencies change as major producers expand renewable and hydrogen capacity?Six GCC grids have been interconnected since 2009 11
Strategic maritime corridorsHow would disruption at a strait or canal propagate through energy, food and container trade?About 20 million b/d of oil through Hormuz in 2024 4
Food-import dependenceWhich origin markets, ports and storage determine food-security exposure for import-dependent states?Suez tonnage fell 70% by mid-2024 as ships rerouted 13
Extreme heat and public healthWhere does heat combine with power, water and labour conditions to create health and productivity risk?Temperatures passed 50 °C in five countries in 2024 7
The five shared systems of the Middle East and North Africa programme and the question each examines, as recorded on 21 October 2026, with the public evidence that shows why each matters to the UAE cluster.

Fig. 02Water that depends on power

Water that depends on power Bar chart of online desalination capacity in 2025: Saudi Arabia 17.3, China 14.0, United States 11.0, United Arab Emirates 9.1 and Spain 5.0 million cubic metres a day, with a panel noting the Middle East and North Africa held 46% of global capacity. Saudi Arabia17.3 million m3 a dayChina14 million m3 a dayUnited States11 million m3 a dayUnited Arab Emirates9.1 million m3 a daySpain5 million m3 a day
Online capacity in million cubic metres a day in 2025; the side panel gives the region's share of global capacity and the energy share of operating cost.6Sources: World Bank (2025). As of 21 October 2026.
Figure 2 in words, and its data

Five bars of online desalination capacity in 2025, in million cubic metres a day: Saudi Arabia 17.3, China 14.0, United States 11.0, United Arab Emirates 9.1 (highlighted), Spain 5.0. Note: Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the UAE each have less than 100 cubic metres of internal renewable water per person. Side panel: 46% of global online desalination capacity was in the Middle East and North Africa in 2025; GCC capacity is expected to grow 75% from 2020 to 2030; energy is 37% to 75% of desalination operating cost.

CountryOnline capacity 2025Note
Saudi Arabia17.3 million m³ a day 6Largest in the world
China14.0 million m³ a day 6
United States11.0 million m³ a day 6
United Arab Emirates9.1 million m³ a day 6In the UAE hub cluster
Spain5.0 million m³ a day 6
Middle East and North Africa46% of global online capacity 6GCC capacity expected to grow 75% from 2020 to 2030 6
Data of Figure 2. Online desalination capacity of the five largest national fleets in 2025, in million cubic metres per day, as published by the World Bank.

05Three levels of cooperation, one rule of subsidiarity

Three levels of cooperation, one rule of subsidiarity

The programme organizes cooperation at three levels, and each decides only what cannot be decided below it. At the national level, a National Nexus programme belongs to its country, with a National Desk, a National Model and a National Portfolio 14. Institutions take part through the National Nexus Consortium (NNC), selected leaders through the National Leadership Council (NLC), and experts and volunteers through the National Working Groups (NWG) 14. No country in the UAE cluster has a constituted national programme on record 3.

At the regional level, Regional Nexus Consortiums compare compatible evidence on shared systems and support the regional profiles of Reports, published in the second and fourth quarters, which never override a country's own findings. The UAE hub is a coordination role at this level; regional leadership roles at GRF are in formation and published only once adopted, as the council architecture records. At the global level, the Consortium Secretariat, held by GCRI Canada in Toronto, keeps the programme's records and routes enquiries to the regional desk.

The design is defined by what it refuses. The hub does not represent the six governments, the Gulf Cooperation Council or any free zone. An enquiry receives a reference in the programme's participation records, not a membership, an appointment or a mandate, and a country may decline to share any part of its model.

Fig. 05Three levels of cooperation, one rule

Three levels of cooperation, one rule Three stacked bands. Global: the Consortium Secretariat in Toronto, GCRI, GRF and GRA. Regional: the planned UAE hub for six countries, the planned Saudi Arabia hub and the Regional Nexus Consortium. National: the NNC, the NLC and the NWG. A side panel places the decision with the competent authority. 01GlobalSecretariat, GCRI, GRF, GRA02RegionalTwo planned hubs03NationalNNC, NLC, NWG
Each level takes up a question only when it cannot be settled below it; the decision stays with the competent authority, outside the programme.1,3,14Sources: GCRI, Middle East and North Africa region, Programme status and National Nexus. As of 21 October 2026.
Figure 5 in words

Global band: the Consortium Secretariat, held by GCRI Canada in Toronto, keeps records and routes enquiries; GCRI leads science, evidence and methods; GRF leads leadership, dialogue and Nexus Universe; GRA leads finance, insurance and development readiness. Regional band: the UAE hub, a planned coordination role for six countries with no host; the Saudi Arabia hub, planned, for thirteen countries from the Levant to the Maghreb; the Regional Nexus Consortium, which supports regional profiles of the Reports platform in the second and fourth quarters. National band: each country owns its programme with a National Desk, Model and Portfolio; the NNC brings institutions through six constituency councils, with the National Standards Council as its standards function; the NLC brings selected leaders in personal capacity; the NWG brings experts organized in Competence Cells at institution, community or agency level, any of which can be a CERT. A panel places the decision with the competent authority, operator or financial institution, outside the programme.

06How the cluster's risks are measured

How the cluster's risks are measured

The evidence the cluster needs is held by bodies with their own mandates. The regional climate record is compiled by the World Meteorological Organization with national meteorological services, the UN Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia and the League of Arab States 7; energy flows are tracked by energy agencies 4; shipping by the UNCTAD maritime reviews 5,13; water supply by the World Bank and the utilities 6; and water stress by research institutes such as the World Resources Institute 10. Nearly 60% of Arab countries have multi-hazard early warning systems, above the global share of 60% of all countries reporting one, and still not enough 7,15.

The programme organizes this evidence so that two countries can compare like with like, through twenty systems named by their Nexus Standards codes. For the Middle East and North Africa the model lists NXS-GRX (canonical data, provenance and risk), NXS-EOP (earth observation and digital twins), NXS-EWS (multi-hazard monitoring and warning), NXS-AAP (anticipatory action and triggers), NXS-NET (network topology and continuity) and NXS-COR (compute, nodes and runtimes) among the systems in regional demand 1. Every finding carries one of nine evidence labels, and data reported by an authority is kept apart from programme estimates, which stay labelled as estimates 3.

Fig. 04Heat couples power, water and health

Heat couples power, water and health Bar chart comparing warming trends over 1991 to 2024: 0.43 degrees per decade in the Arab region against about 0.2 globally, with a panel noting the 2024 anomaly of 1.08 degrees, temperatures above 50 degrees in five countries and the 35 degree wet-bulb threshold. Arab region0.43 °C per decadeGlobal0.2 °C per decade
The bars compare two warming trends on one scale; the panel figures are separate measures and are not plotted against it.7,9Sources: WMO (2025); Pal and Eltahir (2016). As of 21 October 2026.
Figure 4 in words, and its data

Two bars of warming trend over 1991 to 2024 in degrees Celsius per decade: Arab region 0.43, range 0.40 to 0.48; global land and ocean about 0.2. Side panel: 2024 was 1.08 °C above the 1991 to 2020 average, the hottest year on record for the region; temperatures exceeded 50 °C in Bahrain, Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and the UAE, straining power grids; the 35 °C wet-bulb limit of human survivability is projected to be approached and exceeded around the Gulf under business-as-usual emissions.

MeasureValueNote
Arab region warming trend, 1991 to 20240.43 °C per decade 7Range 0.40 to 0.48 °C per decade
Global land and ocean warming trendAbout 0.2 °C per decade 7
2024 anomaly, Arab region+1.08 °C 7Against the 1991 to 2020 average; hottest year on record
Wet-bulb survivability threshold35 °C 9Projected to be approached and exceeded around the Gulf under business-as-usual emissions
Data of Figure 4. Warming trends over 1991 to 2024 and the 2024 anomaly for the Arab region, as published by the World Meteorological Organization.

07The instruments that already govern shared risk

The instruments that already govern shared risk

Cooperation in the cluster starts from instruments its countries already own: national water, energy and civil-defence laws, the interconnection agreements of the GCC grid, and the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction, the global frame to 2030 11,16. The UAE hosted the UN climate conference, COP28, in Dubai in 2023 7. The programme aligns its evidence to these instruments and never substitutes for them. The Nexus Standards on water utilities, hydrometeorological hazards and energy risk are proposed, not adopted; each country decides whether to use them through its National Standards Council, under a governance model in which no stakeholder group holds more than one third of any decision.

YearInstrument or arrangementStatus and relevance
2009GCC power interconnectionSix national grids joined into a single network 11
2015Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015–2030In force to 2030 for every country in the cluster 16
2023COP28, the UN climate conference, hosted by the UAE in DubaiArab States have hosted five sessions, from COP7 in 2001 to COP28 in 2023 7
2025Early Warnings for All, global status119 countries, 60% of all, report a multi-hazard early warning system 15
Selected instruments and arrangements that govern shared risk in the UAE cluster, with their status as of 21 October 2026.

08What institutions in the cluster can do now

What institutions in the cluster can do now

At service level R0, participation begins with a question. Applications, payments, compute allocations and registrations open only when their team, terms and review capacity exist 3.

  • Governments and emirates: send a material question on a shared system through the enquiry form; the reply gives a reference and the next step. A city or emirate relationship never becomes national representation.
  • Water, power and port operators: propose a dependency to examine, such as a desalination plant and its power supply, an interconnector or a port hinterland; operators keep full control of their systems, and restricted topology never appears in a public view.
  • Universities and research centres: bring a method or a dataset through contributing to the quarterly reports, credited to you and published with its limits.
  • Central banks, insurers and takaful operators: read the region's finance questions with GRA on protection gaps and on handoffs to the institutions that decide; readiness evidence is never a financing or underwriting decision.
  • Civil defence and health authorities: propose an exercise question for the annual programme of Nexus Universe (universe.nexus), in which every participant acts within its own mandate.

09What is changing

What is changing

  • Heat at the edge of survivability. Regional warming at about twice the global rate brings humid-heat extremes closer to the 35 °C wet-bulb threshold 7,9.
  • Rain as a new hazard. The April 2024 event showed that desert cities face flood risk their drainage was never designed for 7.
  • Desalination growth. GCC capacity is set to grow by 75% over 2020 to 2030, deepening the coupling of water and power 6.
  • Chokepoint concentration. Conflict in June 2025 renewed attention on the Strait of Hormuz, through which 34% of seaborne oil exports pass 5.
  • Compute meets cooling. The hub's recorded focus on compute reflects data-centre growth in a climate where cooling and water are the binding constraints 1.

10Three faces of cooperation in the Gulf

Three faces of cooperation in the Gulf

GCRI leads on science, methods and evidence, and keeps the regional record on its Middle East and North Africa page. GRF leads leadership, institutional dialogue and the governance of Nexus Universe, with its view on the region at GRF. GRA reads the evidence for finance, insurance and development readiness on the region at GRA, where the recorded financial questions include energy-transition exposure in sovereign and public balance sheets, trade-finance and maritime-insurance questions for strategic corridors, and technology and compute concentration in regional financial centres 1. Risk Academy in the region teaches the same methods in the open. Every stage follows the Nexus cycle, and the decide step sits outside the programme.

What this page does not claim: the UAE hub is a planned coordination role with no host decision on record; it is not an office, a public authority or a representative of any government, emirate, free zone or regional organization. No GCC Nexus Consortium and no Dubai or Abu Dhabi seat exist. The region is in formation and the service level is R0. Naming an agency or an arrangement is not a claim of partnership or endorsement. GCRI does not regulate or certify, GRF does not regulate, finance or procure, and GRA does not lend, underwrite, rate or invest. Any finance vehicle is formed, if at all, by competent lawful actors outside the programme, as the lawful handoffs page explains.

Questions

Questions and answers

Is there a GCRI or Nexus office in Dubai?

No. No office, host or seat is recorded in Dubai, Abu Dhabi or anywhere else in the region. The UAE hub is a planned coordination role, and the only recorded seat of the programme is the Consortium Secretariat with GCRI Canada in Toronto.

Why does the UAE cluster include Iran but not Saudi Arabia?

The programme groups countries by the systems they share, not by political membership. Iran shares the Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz with the cluster. Saudi Arabia is the focus of its own planned hub, which covers thirteen countries.

Is this a programme of the Gulf Cooperation Council?

No. The page does not describe a GCC body, and no GCC Nexus Consortium is on record. Naming the GCC grid or any regional arrangement is a statement about shared infrastructure, not a claim of partnership.

Can a sovereign fund or a bank buy a role in the regional programme?

No. Ordinary participation has no fee, funding never buys a seat or a vote, and cooperation with public bodies never depends on a membership tier. Financial institutions take part through a cross-cutting pathway that informs every constituency without governing any.

Who decides what the cluster works on?

Each national programme sets its own agenda. Regional work compares compatible evidence on shared systems, no regional body binds a country, and every decision is taken by the competent authority, operator or financial institution under its own rules.

Terms

Glossary

Planned hub
A regional coordination role for a group of countries; it operates only once a host decision is on record, and is never an office or an exclusive territory.
Wet-bulb temperature
A combined measure of heat and humidity; above about 35 °C the human body cannot cool itself by sweating, even in shade and wind.
Online desalination capacity
The installed desalination capacity in operation, expressed in cubic metres of water a day.
Chokepoint
A narrow passage, such as a strait or canal, through which a large share of a trade flow must pass.
Service level R0
The current state of the programme: information and enquiries, with a durable reference for each enquiry.
Shared system
Infrastructure or an ecosystem that crosses borders, examined with compatible methods by the countries that share it.

Reuse and cite

Text CC BY 4.0. Cite the page with its date; data tables are linked under each figure.

Sources

References

16 sources, numbered in the order they are first cited
  1. The Global Centre for Risk and Innovation (2026-10). Middle East and North Africa region. therisk.global. Accessed 2026-10-21.
  2. The Global Centre for Risk and Innovation (2026-10). Six programme regions. therisk.global. Accessed 2026-10-21.
  3. The Global Centre for Risk and Innovation (2026-10). Programme status. therisk.global. Accessed 2026-10-21.
  4. U.S. Energy Information Administration (2025-06-16). Amid regional conflict, the Strait of Hormuz remains critical oil chokepoint. www.eia.gov. Accessed 2026-10-21.
  5. UN Trade and Development (UNCTAD) (2025). Review of Maritime Transport 2025, chapter II. unctad.org. Accessed 2026-10-21.
  6. World Bank (2025-12). Fresh Perspectives: Emerging Issues and Opportunities for Desalination in the Middle East and North Africa. documents1.worldbank.org. Accessed 2026-10-21.
  7. World Meteorological Organization, with ESCWA and the League of Arab States (2025-12). State of the Climate in the Arab Region 2024. wmo.int. Accessed 2026-10-21.
  8. World Meteorological Organization (2025-12-04). Temperature increase is accelerating in Arab Region, with escalating impacts. wmo.int. Accessed 2026-10-21.
  9. Pal and Eltahir, Nature Climate Change 6 (2016-02). Future temperature in southwest Asia projected to exceed a threshold for human adaptability. doi.org. Accessed 2026-10-21.
  10. World Resources Institute (Aqueduct 4.0) (2023-08-16). 25 countries, housing one-quarter of the population, face extremely high water stress. www.wri.org. Accessed 2026-10-21.
  11. GCC Interconnection Authority (2026). GCC Interconnection Authority. www.gccia.com.sa. Accessed 2026-10-21.
  12. The Global Centre for Risk and Innovation (2026-10). Cross-border risk systems. therisk.global. Accessed 2026-10-21.
  13. UN Trade and Development (UNCTAD) (2024). Review of Maritime Transport 2024. unctad.org. Accessed 2026-10-21.
  14. The Global Centre for Risk and Innovation (2026-10). National Nexus. therisk.global. Accessed 2026-10-21.
  15. World Meteorological Organization and UN Office for Disaster Risk Reduction (2025-11-12). Early warning systems reach new heights, but critical gaps jeopardize global progress. wmo.int. Accessed 2026-10-21.
  16. United Nations General Assembly (2015-06-03). Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015–2030 (A/RES/69/283). docs.un.org. Accessed 2026-10-21.

Record

Editorial record

Facts and programme states are given as of 21 October 2026. This page is reviewed at least every 180 days and whenever a hub host decision, a programme state or a cited figure changes. It replaces an earlier version of the same page, whose description of a GCC Nexus Consortium, a UAE-Dubai Nexus cluster hub anchored by 2030, an Abu Dhabi sovereign-capital node, a GCC regional desk and readiness records did not match the programme's current records; those structures are not on record and have been removed.

Published by the GCRI editorial desk under the editorial integrity policy. To report an error or request a correction, use the corrections route; corrections are dated and listed with the page.

Cite this article

GCRI editorial desk (2026, June 26). UAE hub: the Gulf's shared risks and the Dubai cluster. The Global Centre for Risk and Innovation. https://therisk.global/gcc-nexus-consortium-uae-dubai-nexus-cluster-hub/

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Republish or translate this article free of charge, in print or online, under CC BY 4.0: keep the byline and The Global Centre for Risk and Innovation, link to the original and note any change. Figures, maps and twins made by the institutions carry the same licence; third-party data keeps its own credit line.

Attribution to paste
<p>The UAE hub and the Gulf's shared risks: heat, water, power and the Strait of Hormuz — GCRI editorial desk, The Global Centre for Risk and Innovation. First published 26 June 2026 at <a href="https://therisk.global/gcc-nexus-consortium-uae-dubai-nexus-cluster-hub/">https://therisk.global/gcc-nexus-consortium-uae-dubai-nexus-cluster-hub/</a>. Republished under CC BY 4.0 (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).</p>

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