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The Saudi Arabia hub and shared risks from the Maghreb to the Gulf: water, heat and the Red Sea

Thirteen countries from Morocco to Iraq share water scarcity, accelerating heat and one maritime corridor. This page explains the planned Saudi Arabia hub of the Nexus Consortium, the systems it would examine, and why no MENA consortium or Riyadh seat is on record.

As of
21 October 2026
Reading
14 minutes
Evidence
16 sources, cited in order
NEXUS TWIN · WF-1 · COLUMNSSEED 8cdc8ca6GCRI-MAIN.POST.1077681xyzSCHEMATIC · COLUMNSST-01 · 0.427 0.596ST-02 · 0.426 0.579
WF-1 · columns Schematic wireframe twin (columns, drought and soil moisture). An illustration, not data.

Methods and evidence

Evidence
16 sources, cited in order and listed under References
Figures
5 figures
Data availability
Every chart's data is published as a table on this page.
Water
19 of 22
Arab States are water-scarce4
Corridor
~70%
below the 2023 average: Suez Canal tonnage in May 20255
Drought
US$12.15 bn
for the Riyadh Global Drought Resilience Partnership7
Floods
3,958
confirmed deaths in Derna after Storm Daniel6

01What the Saudi Arabia hub is

What the Saudi Arabia hub is

The Saudi Arabia hub is a planned regional coordination role of the Nexus Consortium for thirteen countries: Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, the State of Palestine, Syria, Yemen, Egypt, Libya, Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco. It sits in the Middle East and North Africa programme region, one of six programme regions, beside a planned UAE hub for six countries around the Gulf. Its recorded focus is heat, water, cities, industrial systems, compute and Red Sea dependencies 1. The North African states in the cluster also take part in the Africa programme, because regions describe relationships rather than territory 1.

A planned hub is a coordination role, not an office, a public authority or an exclusive territory. It operates only once its host decision is on record, and none is: the region is in formation, no host and no named programme are recorded, and the programme's current service level is R0, information and enquiries 1,3. This page replaces an earlier one that described a "MENA Nexus Consortium" anchored through "Riyadh Nexus by 2030". No consortium of that name and no Riyadh role are on record. Riyadh appears below as the capital of the hub country and as the host of a United Nations conference, not as a seat.

The cluster is wide and politically diverse: it includes states in conflict, states under reconstruction and an observer state. That diversity is the reason for the programme's first rule. A regional desk can route a question and keep its record; it cannot represent any government, settle any dispute or move any data. The regions and hubs page of the documentation states the rule, and the status and service levels page explains how a state changes only when the record behind it does.

02Why the cluster needs shared risk evidence

Why the cluster needs shared risk evidence

The countries of the cluster share scarcity more than any other condition. According to the World Meteorological Organization, 15 of the world's 20 most water-scarce countries are in the Arab region; 19 of its 22 states are water-scarce and 13 fall below the absolute scarcity threshold of 500 cubic metres per person a year (WMO and ESCWA) 4,8. The region has about 5% of the world's population and less than 2% of its renewable freshwater 4. The World Resources Institute finds that 83% of the population of the Middle East and North Africa is exposed to extremely high water stress, rising to the whole population by 2050 9.

Heat and drought compound the scarcity. 2024 was the region's hottest year on record, 1.08 °C above the 1991 to 2020 average, and temperatures are rising at about twice the global rate 4,8. Drought was most severe in Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia and parts of Libya: 2024 was Morocco's sixth dry year in a row, and the Al Massira Dam, the country's second-largest reservoir, fell to 1% to 2% of capacity in February 2024 4. Then rain arrived as a hazard: flash floods on 6 September 2024 killed 25 people in Morocco and Algeria, and 113.7 mm fell in 24 hours in Jazan, Saudi Arabia, on 23 August 4. Extreme events killed more than 300 people across the region in 2024 8.

Drought is now a matter of global negotiation in the hub country itself. At the UN Convention to Combat Desertification conference that ended in Riyadh on 14 December 2024, the Riyadh Global Drought Resilience Partnership attracted USD 12.15 billion to support 80 vulnerable countries, including a USD 10 billion pledge from the Arab Coordination Group 7. Droughts affect the livelihoods of 1.8 billion people and cost an estimated USD 300 billion a year 7.

Fig. 01Thirteen countries, two seas, one corridor

Thirteen countries, two seas, one corridor Map from Morocco to Iraq and Yemen with the thirteen countries of the planned Saudi Arabia hub cluster highlighted, the six Gulf countries of the UAE hub shaded separately, and callouts on Derna, the Suez Canal and the Gulf of Aden. Saudi ArabiaCountries in focus
Cluster colours show coordination groupings in the programme model, not territory or jurisdiction; Riyadh is marked for orientation only.1,6,10,5Sources: GCRI; UNCTAD; World Weather Attribution; Natural Earth. As of 21 October 2026.
Figure 1 in words

A Lambert conformal map of North Africa and the Middle East. Gold: the Saudi Arabia hub cluster, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, the State of Palestine, Syria, Yemen, Egypt, Libya, Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco. Grey-blue: the six countries of the UAE hub. Callouts: 3,958 confirmed deaths in Derna after Storm Daniel in September 2023; Suez Canal tonnage about 70% below its 2023 average in early May 2025; Gulf of Aden tonnage down 76% by mid-2024, with Cape of Good Hope arrivals up 89%. Riyadh is marked. A legend states that hubs are coordination roles and none is operating.

03Why coupling changes the question

Why coupling changes the question

The cluster's systems are coupled through water, energy and one maritime corridor. The Middle East and North Africa held 46% of the world's online desalination capacity in 2025, and Saudi Arabia operated the largest national fleet, 17.3 million cubic metres a day 11. Outside the Gulf, Jordan and Morocco are building public-private desalination projects of 822,000 cubic metres a day each, the largest outside the GCC 11. Water that comes from the sea is water that depends on power, ports and finance.

The Red Sea joins the cluster to world trade, and its disruption shows how quickly a corridor can fail. By mid-2024, according to UNCTAD, tonnage through the Gulf of Aden had fallen 76% and through the Suez Canal 70%, while arrivals at the Cape of Good Hope rose 89% as ships took the long way round 10. Longer routes raised global ton-mile demand by 3% and container ship demand by 12% 10. By early May 2025 tonnage through the canal was still around 70% below its 2023 average (Review of Maritime Transport 2025, chapter II) 5. For the import-dependent states of the cluster, a corridor that runs the long way round is a question of supply time and cost for food and fuel. Saudi Arabia's East-West pipeline, which can carry 5 million barrels a day from Abqaiq to Yanbu on the Red Sea, links the same corridor to the Gulf 12.

The Derna floods show the final coupling, between a hazard and the institutions meant to contain it. On 10 September 2023 extreme rainfall from Storm Daniel hit north-eastern Libya. World Weather Attribution found that climate change made such rainfall up to 50 times more likely and up to 50% more intense, though still a 1-in-300 to 600 year event 6. Two dams built in the 1970s failed above Derna; conflict and state fragility had contributed to a lack of maintenance, and a forecast with three days' lead time existed whose impacts were not clearly understood 6. By 19 September there were 3,958 confirmed deaths in Derna, 170 elsewhere in Libya, and more than 10,000 people missing 6.

Fig. 03How a storm became a catastrophe

How a storm became a catastrophe Four boxes in sequence: rainfall up to 50 times more likely with climate change; a 1-in-300 to 600 year event; two dams built in the 1970s broke above Derna; and 3,958 confirmed deaths in Derna, 170 elsewhere in Libya and more than 10,000 missing. HAZARDUp to 50xRARITY1 in 300–600INFRASTRUCTURE2 damsPEOPLE3,958
Each box is a separately reported finding of the attribution study; the arrows show sequence, not a modelled causal weight.6Sources: World Weather Attribution (2023). As of 21 October 2026.
Figure 3 in words

Box one, hazard: climate change made the rainfall up to 50 times more likely and up to 50% more intense. Box two, rarity: a 1-in-300 to 600 year event in today's climate. Box three, infrastructure: two dams built in the 1970s broke above Derna; maintenance had lapsed amid conflict. Box four, people: 3,958 confirmed deaths in Derna, 170 elsewhere in Libya, more than 10,000 missing as of 19 September 2023. A note: exposure and vulnerability, including conflict, lapsed dam maintenance and a poorly understood forecast, shaped the outcome.

04Five shared systems the region examines

Five shared systems the region examines

Regional work starts from shared systems, not from institutions. The Middle East and North Africa programme names five, each with the question it examines 1. The cross-border risk systems page sets the rule for all of them: shared-system work compares governed outputs and preserves dissent; it creates no treaty, no transfer of sovereignty and no right to move data 13.

Shared systemThe question it examinesWhy it matters to the Saudi Arabia cluster
Water scarcity and desalinationHow do groundwater depletion, desalination capacity and energy supply interact under prolonged heat and drought?19 of 22 Arab States are water-scarce 4
Energy transitionWhich grid, storage and export dependencies change as major producers expand renewable and hydrogen capacity?The East-West pipeline carries up to 5 million b/d to the Red Sea 12
Strategic maritime corridorsHow would disruption at a strait or canal propagate through energy, food and container trade?Suez tonnage about 70% below its 2023 average in May 2025 5
Food-import dependenceWhich origin markets, ports and storage determine food-security exposure for import-dependent states?Maghreb wheat yields were well below average in the 2024 drought 4
Extreme heat and public healthWhere does heat combine with power, water and labour conditions to create health and productivity risk?More than 300 deaths from extremes across the region in 2024 8
The five shared systems of the Middle East and North Africa programme and the question each examines, as recorded on 21 October 2026, with the public evidence that shows why each matters to the Saudi Arabia cluster.

Fig. 04A corridor rerouted around a continent

A corridor rerouted around a continent Diverging bar chart of shipping changes by mid-2024: Gulf of Aden tonnage down 76%, Suez Canal tonnage down 70%, Cape of Good Hope arrivals up 89%, container ship demand up 12% and global ton-mile demand up 3%. Gulf of Aden tonnage-76 per cent changeSuez Canal tonnage-70 per cent changeCape of Good Hope arrivals89 per cent changeContainer ship demand12 per cent changeGlobal ton-mile demand3 per cent change
Percentage changes by mid-2024 on one diverging scale; declines in grey, increases in gold.10,5Sources: UNCTAD (2024, 2025). As of 21 October 2026.
Figure 4 in words, and its data

Five bars on one diverging scale of percentage change by mid-2024: Gulf of Aden tonnage minus 76%; Suez Canal tonnage minus 70%; Cape of Good Hope arrivals plus 89%; container ship demand plus 12%; global ton-mile demand plus 3%. Note: by early May 2025 Suez Canal tonnage was still about 70% below its 2023 average.

MeasureChangeNote
Gulf of Aden tonnage−76% 10By mid-2024
Suez Canal tonnage−70% 10By mid-2024; still about 70% below the 2023 average in early May 2025 5
Cape of Good Hope arrivals+89% 10Ships rerouted around Africa
Container ship demand+12% 10Longer routes
Global ton-mile demand+3% 10Longer routes
Data of Figure 4. Change in Red Sea and related shipping by mid-2024, and the canal's level in May 2025, as published by UNCTAD.

05Three levels of cooperation, one rule of subsidiarity

Three levels of cooperation, one rule of subsidiarity

The programme organizes cooperation at three levels, and each decides only what cannot be decided below it. At the national level, a National Nexus programme belongs to its country, with a National Desk, a National Model and a National Portfolio 14. Institutions take part through the National Nexus Consortium (NNC), selected leaders through the National Leadership Council (NLC), and experts and volunteers through the National Working Groups (NWG) 14. No country in the cluster has a constituted national programme on record 3.

At the regional level, Regional Nexus Consortiums compare compatible evidence on shared systems and support the regional profiles of Reports, published in the second and fourth quarters, which never override a country's own findings. The Saudi Arabia hub is a coordination role at this level; regional leadership roles at GRF are in formation and published only once adopted, as the council architecture records. The UAE hub coordinates the six countries around the Gulf. At the global level, the Consortium Secretariat, held by GCRI Canada in Toronto, keeps the programme's records and routes enquiries to the regional desk.

For a cluster that spans active conflict, the refusals matter most. The hub does not represent any government or mediate any dispute. Two countries compare their models only where both agree, a country may decline to share any part of its model, and an enquiry receives a reference in the programme's participation records, never a mandate.

Fig. 05Three levels of cooperation, one rule

Three levels of cooperation, one rule Three stacked bands. Global: the Consortium Secretariat in Toronto, GCRI, GRF and GRA. Regional: the planned Saudi Arabia hub for 13 countries, the planned UAE hub and the Regional Nexus Consortium. National: the NNC, the NLC and the NWG. A side panel places the decision with the competent authority. 01GlobalSecretariat, GCRI, GRF, GRA02RegionalTwo planned hubs03NationalNNC, NLC, NWG
Each level takes up a question only when it cannot be settled below it; the decision stays with the competent authority, outside the programme.1,3,14Sources: GCRI, Middle East and North Africa region, Programme status and National Nexus. As of 21 October 2026.
Figure 5 in words

Global band: the Consortium Secretariat, held by GCRI Canada in Toronto, keeps records and routes enquiries; GCRI leads science, evidence and methods; GRF leads leadership, dialogue and Nexus Universe; GRA leads finance, insurance and development readiness. Regional band: the Saudi Arabia hub, a planned coordination role for 13 countries with no host; the UAE hub, planned, for six countries around the Gulf; the Regional Nexus Consortium, which supports regional profiles of the Reports platform in the second and fourth quarters. National band: each country owns its programme with a National Desk, Model and Portfolio; the NNC brings institutions through six constituency councils, with the National Standards Council as its standards function; the NLC brings selected leaders in personal capacity; the NWG brings experts organized in Competence Cells at institution, community or agency level, any of which can be a CERT. A panel places the decision with the competent authority, outside the programme.

06How the cluster's risks are measured

How the cluster's risks are measured

The evidence the cluster needs is held by bodies with their own mandates: the regional climate record by the World Meteorological Organization with national services, ESCWA and the League of Arab States 4; attribution of extremes by research consortia 6; shipping by UNCTAD 10,5; water supply by the World Bank and national water authorities, such as the Water Authority that Saudi Arabia's National Water Strategy 2030 established 11,4; and land and drought by the UNCCD 7. Nearly 60% of Arab countries have multi-hazard early warning systems, about the global share of 60% of countries, which still leaves the rest without one 4,15.

The programme organizes this evidence so that two countries can compare like with like, through twenty systems named by their Nexus Standards codes. For the Middle East and North Africa the model lists NXS-GRX (canonical data, provenance and risk), NXS-DSS (decision cases and deliberation), NXS-EOP (earth observation and digital twins), NXS-EWS (multi-hazard monitoring and warning), NXS-AAP (anticipatory action and triggers) and NXS-RLS (participants, agreements and handoffs) among the systems in regional demand 1. Derna is the case for all of them: a forecast existed, and what failed was the chain from forecast to understood impact to action 6.

Fig. 02The region desalinates because it must

The region desalinates because it must Bar chart of shares of global online desalination capacity in 2025: Middle East and North Africa 46%, East Asia and Pacific 23%, North America 11%, Western Europe 7%, with a panel noting 19 of 22 Arab States are water-scarce and 83% of the MENA population faces extremely high water stress. Middle East and North Africa46 per centEast Asia and Pacific23 per centNorth America11 per centWestern Europe7 per cent
Shares of global online desalination capacity in 2025 by region; the panel gives separate measures of scarcity and is not plotted on the same scale.11,4,9Sources: World Bank (2025); WMO (2025); WRI (2023). As of 21 October 2026.
Figure 2 in words, and its data

Four bars of share of global online desalination capacity in 2025: Middle East and North Africa 46%, East Asia and the Pacific 23%, North America 11%, Western Europe 7%. Note: Saudi Arabia has the largest national fleet, 17.3 million cubic metres a day. Side panel: 19 of 22 Arab States are water-scarce and 13 are below 500 cubic metres per person; the Arab region has about 5% of world population and less than 2% of renewable freshwater; 83% of the MENA population faces extremely high water stress.

MeasureValueSource note
Middle East and North Africa46% of global online capacity 11Saudi Arabia: 17.3 million m³ a day 11
East Asia and the Pacific23% 11
North America11% 11
Western Europe7% 11
Arab States that are water-scarce19 of 22 413 below 500 m³ per person a year
Share of world population and renewable freshwaterAbout 5% and less than 2% 4
MENA population under extremely high water stress83% 9100% by 2050 9
Data of Figure 2. Shares of global online desalination capacity in 2025 by region, and measures of water scarcity in the Arab region.

07The instruments that already govern shared risk

The instruments that already govern shared risk

Cooperation in the cluster starts from instruments its countries already own: national water strategies, such as Saudi Arabia's National Water Strategy 2030 and its Water Authority 4; the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction, the global frame to 2030 16; and the drought agenda advanced at COP16 in Riyadh, which laid groundwork for a future global drought regime to be completed at COP17 in 2026 7. The programme aligns its evidence to these instruments and never substitutes for them. The Nexus Standards on water risk, food security and nutrition risk and hydrometeorological hazards are proposed, not adopted; each country decides whether to use them through its National Standards Council, under a governance model in which no stakeholder group holds more than one third of any decision.

YearInstrument or agreementStatus and relevance
2015Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015–2030In force to 2030 for every country in the cluster 16
ContinuingSaudi Arabia: National Water Strategy 2030Established the Water Authority for planning, regulation and oversight 4
2024UNCCD COP16, Riyadh: Riyadh Global Drought Resilience PartnershipUSD 12.15 billion for 80 vulnerable countries 7
2025Early Warnings for All, global status119 countries, 60% of all, report a multi-hazard early warning system 15
Selected instruments and agreements that govern shared risk in the Saudi Arabia cluster, with their status as of 21 October 2026.

08What institutions in the cluster can do now

What institutions in the cluster can do now

At service level R0, participation begins with a question. Applications, payments, compute allocations and registrations open only when their team, terms and review capacity exist 3.

  • Governments and municipalities: send a material question on a shared system through the enquiry form; the reply gives a reference and the next step.
  • Water, power and port operators: propose a dependency to examine, such as a desalination plant and its power supply, a reservoir in drought or a Red Sea port; operators keep full control of their systems, and restricted topology never appears in a public view.
  • Universities and meteorological services: bring a method or a dataset through contributing to the quarterly reports, credited to you and published with its limits.
  • Development banks, insurers and supervisors: read the region's finance questions with GRA on protection gaps and on handoffs to the institutions that decide; readiness evidence is never a financing decision.
  • Civil protection and humanitarian agencies: propose an exercise question for the annual programme of Nexus Universe (universe.nexus); simulation messages are never delivered as warnings.

09What is changing

What is changing

  • Drought as global policy. COP16 in Riyadh mobilized USD 12.15 billion for drought resilience and set a path to a global drought regime 7.
  • Corridor risk becomes structural. More than a year after the first diversions, Suez Canal tonnage remained about 70% below its 2023 average 5.
  • Desalination beyond the Gulf. Jordan and Morocco are building plants of 822,000 cubic metres a day, so the water-energy coupling now reaches middle-income states 11.
  • Compound extremes. In 2024 the region saw drought and flash floods in the same countries, often in the same season 4.
  • Warnings that reach action. Derna showed that a forecast is not a warning until its impacts are understood and acted on 6.

10Three faces of cooperation in the cluster

Three faces of cooperation in the cluster

GCRI leads on science, methods and evidence, and keeps the regional record on its Middle East and North Africa page. GRF leads leadership, institutional dialogue and the governance of Nexus Universe, with its view on the region at GRF. GRA reads the evidence for finance, insurance and development readiness on the region at GRA, where the recorded financial questions include energy-transition exposure in sovereign balance sheets and trade-finance and maritime-insurance questions for strategic corridors 1. Risk Academy in the region teaches the same methods in the open. Every stage follows the Nexus cycle, and the decide step sits outside the programme.

What this page does not claim: the Saudi Arabia hub is a planned coordination role with no host decision on record; it is not an office, a public authority or a representative of any government, and it mediates no dispute. No MENA Nexus Consortium and no Riyadh seat exist. The region is in formation and the service level is R0. Naming an agency, a conference or an agreement is not a claim of partnership or endorsement. GCRI does not regulate or certify, GRF does not regulate, finance or procure, and GRA does not lend, underwrite, rate or invest. Any finance vehicle is formed, if at all, by competent lawful actors outside the programme, as the lawful handoffs page explains.

Questions

Questions and answers

Is there a GCRI or Nexus office in Riyadh?

No. No office, host or seat is recorded in Riyadh or elsewhere in the region. The Saudi Arabia hub is a planned coordination role, and the only recorded seat of the programme is the Consortium Secretariat with GCRI Canada in Toronto.

Which countries would the Saudi Arabia hub coordinate?

Thirteen: Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, the State of Palestine, Syria, Yemen, Egypt, Libya, Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco. The UAE, Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar and Iran belong to the planned UAE hub.

How can one cluster include countries in conflict with each other?

Because a cluster is a coordination grouping for shared systems, not an alliance. No country is bound by regional work, two countries compare their models only where both agree, and any country may decline to share any part of its model.

What happened to the MENA Nexus Consortium?

No programme of that name is on record. The earlier page used it for a proposal. The region is in formation, with no named programme and no host, and the planned hubs are coordination roles.

Does the programme finance drought or water projects?

No. GRA reads evidence for the institutions that finance, and those institutions decide on their own terms. The programme does not lend, invest, underwrite or arrange any transaction.

Terms

Glossary

Planned hub
A regional coordination role for a group of countries; it operates only once a host decision is on record, and is never an office or an exclusive territory.
Absolute water scarcity
Renewable freshwater below 500 cubic metres per person a year.
Attribution study
A scientific assessment of how much climate change altered the likelihood or intensity of a specific extreme event.
Ton-mile demand
Cargo weight multiplied by distance travelled; it rises when ships take longer routes.
Service level R0
The current state of the programme: information and enquiries, with a durable reference for each enquiry.
Shared system
Infrastructure or an ecosystem that crosses borders, examined with compatible methods by the countries that share it.

Reuse and cite

Text CC BY 4.0. Cite the page with its date; data tables are linked under each figure.

Sources

References

16 sources, numbered in the order they are first cited
  1. The Global Centre for Risk and Innovation (2026-10). Middle East and North Africa region. therisk.global. Accessed 2026-10-21.
  2. The Global Centre for Risk and Innovation (2026-10). Six programme regions. therisk.global. Accessed 2026-10-21.
  3. The Global Centre for Risk and Innovation (2026-10). Programme status. therisk.global. Accessed 2026-10-21.
  4. World Meteorological Organization, with ESCWA and the League of Arab States (2025-12). State of the Climate in the Arab Region 2024. wmo.int. Accessed 2026-10-21.
  5. UN Trade and Development (UNCTAD) (2025). Review of Maritime Transport 2025, chapter II. unctad.org. Accessed 2026-10-21.
  6. World Weather Attribution (2023-09-19). Interplay of climate change-exacerbated rainfall, exposure and vulnerability led to widespread impacts in the Mediterranean region. www.worldweatherattribution.org. Accessed 2026-10-21.
  7. UN Convention to Combat Desertification (UNCCD) (2024-12-14). United Nations conference in Riyadh charts a path for global action on land, drought. www.unccd.int. Accessed 2026-10-21.
  8. World Meteorological Organization (2025-12-04). Temperature increase is accelerating in Arab Region, with escalating impacts. wmo.int. Accessed 2026-10-21.
  9. World Resources Institute (Aqueduct 4.0) (2023-08-16). 25 countries, housing one-quarter of the population, face extremely high water stress. www.wri.org. Accessed 2026-10-21.
  10. UN Trade and Development (UNCTAD) (2024). Review of Maritime Transport 2024. unctad.org. Accessed 2026-10-21.
  11. World Bank (2025-12). Fresh Perspectives: Emerging Issues and Opportunities for Desalination in the Middle East and North Africa. documents1.worldbank.org. Accessed 2026-10-21.
  12. U.S. Energy Information Administration (2025-06-16). Amid regional conflict, the Strait of Hormuz remains critical oil chokepoint. www.eia.gov. Accessed 2026-10-21.
  13. The Global Centre for Risk and Innovation (2026-10). Cross-border risk systems. therisk.global. Accessed 2026-10-21.
  14. The Global Centre for Risk and Innovation (2026-10). National Nexus. therisk.global. Accessed 2026-10-21.
  15. World Meteorological Organization and UN Office for Disaster Risk Reduction (2025-11-12). Early warning systems reach new heights, but critical gaps jeopardize global progress. wmo.int. Accessed 2026-10-21.
  16. United Nations General Assembly (2015-06-03). Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015–2030 (A/RES/69/283). docs.un.org. Accessed 2026-10-21.

Record

Editorial record

Facts and programme states are given as of 21 October 2026. This page is reviewed at least every 180 days and whenever a hub host decision, a programme state or a cited figure changes. It replaces an earlier version of the same page, whose description of a MENA Nexus Consortium, a Riyadh Nexus cluster hub anchored by 2030, a capital-facing regional role and readiness records did not match the programme's current records; those structures are not on record and have been removed.

Published by the GCRI editorial desk under the editorial integrity policy. To report an error or request a correction, use the corrections route; corrections are dated and listed with the page.

Cite this article

GCRI editorial desk (2026, June 26). Saudi Arabia hub: shared risks and the Riyadh cluster. The Global Centre for Risk and Innovation. https://therisk.global/mena-nexus-consortium-riyadh-nexus-cluster-hub/

Republish

Republish or translate this article free of charge, in print or online, under CC BY 4.0: keep the byline and The Global Centre for Risk and Innovation, link to the original and note any change. Figures, maps and twins made by the institutions carry the same licence; third-party data keeps its own credit line.

Attribution to paste
<p>The Saudi Arabia hub and shared risks from the Maghreb to the Gulf: water, heat and the Red Sea — GCRI editorial desk, The Global Centre for Risk and Innovation. First published 26 June 2026 at <a href="https://therisk.global/mena-nexus-consortium-riyadh-nexus-cluster-hub/">https://therisk.global/mena-nexus-consortium-riyadh-nexus-cluster-hub/</a>. Republished under CC BY 4.0 (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).</p>

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