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The United States hub: shared waters, grids and supply chains of the United States and Mexico

The United States and Mexico share treaty rivers, a coupled grid and an integrated supply chain. This page explains how the Nexus Consortium's planned United States hub would help both countries examine those shared risks with compatible evidence, and what the hub does not do.

As of
21 October 2026
Reading
16 minutes
Evidence
20 sources, cited in order
NEXUS TWIN · WF-1 · GLOBESEED 91dc9485GCRI-MAIN.POST.1077684xyzSCHEMATIC · GLOBEST-01 · 0.277 0.481ST-02 · 0.616 0.292
WF-1 · globe Schematic wireframe twin (globe, climate system). An illustration, not data.

Methods and evidence

Evidence
20 sources, cited in order and listed under References
Figures
5 figures
Data availability
Every chart's data is published as a table on this page.
Losses
US$182.7 bn
from 27 billion-dollar disasters in the United States in 20245
Trade
US$871.6 bn
of United States goods trade with Mexico in 20254
Water
1.5 m acre-feet
of Colorado River water owed to Mexico each year3
Compute
up to 12%
of US electricity could go to data centres by 20287

01What the United States hub is

What the United States hub is

The United States hub is a planned regional coordination role of the Nexus Consortium, the public-good programme through which GCRI, GRF and GRA help countries examine interconnected risk with shared methods. It sits in the North America programme region, one of six programme regions, alongside a planned Canada hub. It covers two countries, the United States and Mexico, and its recorded focus is federal, state, Tribal and territorial interfaces; power, digital infrastructure, hazard resilience and supply chains 1.

A planned hub is a coordination role, not an operational site, an office or an exclusive territory. It operates only once its host decision is on record, and none is today: the region is in formation, and the programme's current service level is R0, information and enquiries 1,8. Mexico also takes part in the Latin America and the Caribbean programme, because its hurricane, seismic and food-system exposure is shared southward as well as northward 1.

Distinct from the hub is GCRI US, the United States institution of GCRI: a separate organization with its own legal identity, governance and responsibilities, working within GCRI's research, development and policy mandate and scoped to United States institutions, law and systems. Its published address is in Lanham, Maryland. GCRI US is not a pillar institution, it does not fund, invest in, procure for or approve projects, and it claims no relationship with any specific government body 2. An earlier version of this page described a "United States Nexus Consortium" anchored by 2030 through a "Washington Nexus" cluster hub, with twelve regional pathways. None of those structures is on the programme's record, and they are withdrawn here.

02Why the United States and Mexico need shared evidence

Why the United States and Mexico need shared evidence

The systems that carry risk in this pair of countries are shared by treaty and by market. Under the 1944 Water Treaty the United States delivers Mexico 1.5 million acre-feet of Colorado River water a year, with deliveries reduced during drought in proportion to cuts in United States use, and Mexico owes the United States at least 1.75 million acre-feet of Rio Grande tributary flows in each five-year cycle 3. Mexico has missed its Rio Grande obligation on several occasions since 1994; as of April 2025, with six months of the cycle left, its deliveries were estimated at about 0.51 million acre-feet, and in March 2025 the United States for the first time denied a Mexican request for Colorado River water delivered to Tijuana 3. Water stress on one side of the border becomes a diplomatic, agricultural and municipal question on the other.

Supply chains bind the two economies more tightly still. United States goods trade with Mexico was about US$871.6 billion in 2025, against about US$715.5 billion with Canada 4,9. Grids are coupled too: the North American Electric Reliability Corporation works to assure the reliability and security of the bulk power system in the United States, Canada and part of Mexico (Who we are) 10. And the grid now carries a new load. Data centres used about 4.4% of United States electricity in 2023, 176 TWh, and could use 6.7% to 12% by 2028 7.

Hazards turn these couplings into losses. In 2024 the United States counted 27 separate weather and climate disasters that each cost at least US$1 billion, together US$182.7 billion, the fourth costliest year in the series; 2023 had set the record number, 28 events, at US$92.9 billion 5,11. In May 2025 NOAA announced that the series would be retired, with no updates beyond 2024 6. A public baseline that federal, state and private institutions relied on has ended, at the moment the losses it measured were rising. That is the gap regional cooperation in the programme is designed to help close, with documented, comparable records.

03Why coupling changes the risk calculus

Why coupling changes the risk calculus

The United States defines 16 critical infrastructure sectors, from energy and water to healthcare, communications and critical manufacturing 12. The sectors are listed separately, but they fail together. Infrastructures depend on one another physically, through information and control systems, geographically and through markets and regulation (Identifying, understanding, and analyzing critical infrastructure interdependencies) 13, and interdependent networks are more fragile than isolated ones: beyond a threshold a failure in one can cascade into another and collapse both abruptly 14.

Hurricane Helene showed how far such a cascade travels. The storm caused at least 250 deaths in the United States, at least 175 of them direct, and an estimated US$78.7 billion in damage; about 7.4 million customers, some 16.2 million people, lost power 15. Flooding in North Carolina halted production at the North Cove facility, the largest manufacturer of intravenous and peritoneal dialysis solutions in the country, and hospitals nationwide faced a shortage of those solutions 16. A storm in the southern Appalachians became a national health-supply problem within days. No single agency's risk register holds that chain end to end; it has to be assembled from the hurricane record, the grid record and the medical supply record, each held by a different institution.

Fig. 01Shared rivers, one supply chain: the United States hub's coverage

Shared rivers, one supply chain: the United States hub's coverage Lambert map of the United States and Mexico with GCRI US marked at Lanham, Maryland, a trade arc for US$871.6 billion of 2025 goods trade, and callouts for 1.5 million acre-feet of Colorado River water a year to Mexico, 1.75 million acre-feet of Rio Grande water per cycle to the United States and 7.4 million customers without power after Helene. United States of AmericaMexicoCountries in focus
The water arcs are schematic, not river courses; the trade arc's width stands for US$871.6 billion of 2025 goods trade. Callout values are each from their own source.1,2,4,9,3,15,16Sources: GCRI; US Census Bureau; Congressional Research Service; NOAA NHC; CDC; Natural Earth. As of 21 October 2026.
Figure 1 in words

A Lambert conformal map of the United States and Mexico. The United States is shaded in the GCRI accent and labelled as the planned United States hub; Mexico is shaded green and noted as also taking part in Latin America and the Caribbean. A thick grey arc stands for United States goods trade with Mexico of 871.6 billion US dollars in 2025, against 715.5 billion with Canada. A blue arc near the Colorado delta marks the 1.5 million acre-feet a year of Colorado River water owed by the United States to Mexico; a green arc on the lower Rio Grande marks the 1.75 million acre-feet owed by Mexico to the United States per five-year cycle. In North Carolina a callout states that 7.4 million customers lost power in Hurricane Helene in September 2024 and that flooding halted the largest United States maker of intravenous fluids. Lanham, Maryland, is marked as the published address of GCRI US.

04Five shared systems the region examines

Five shared systems the region examines

Regional work in the programme starts from shared systems, not from institutions. The North America programme names five, each with the question it examines 1. The cross-border risk systems page sets the rule for all of them: shared-system work compares governed outputs and preserves dissent; it creates no treaty, no transfer of sovereignty and no right to move data.

Shared systemThe question it examinesWhy it matters here
Great Lakes, Colorado and Rio Grande watersHow do drought, allocation and quality pressures change water security across shared basins?1.5 million acre-feet a year to Mexico; 1.75 million per cycle to the United States 3
Continental supply chainsWhich border crossings, rail networks and ports concentrate exposure for integrated manufacturing?About US$871.6 billion of goods trade with Mexico in 2025 4
Integrated electricity and energyHow do interties, gas supply, extreme cold and heat create cross-border reliability risk?One reliability organization covers the United States, Canada and part of Mexico 10
Data centres and computeHow do data-centre growth, grid capacity and water use interact, and what continuity do public services need?4.4% of United States electricity in 2023, 6.7% to 12% by 2028 7
Wildfire, heat and smokeWhich health, power and transport systems fail together during cross-border wildfire seasons?Billion-dollar disasters cost US$182.7 billion in 2024 5
The five shared systems of the North America programme and the question each examines, as recorded on 21 October 2026, with public evidence that shows why each matters for the United States and Mexico.

Fig. 02Disaster losses rose as a public baseline ended

Disaster losses rose as a public baseline ended Two bar charts. Cost of billion-dollar disasters: 92.9 billion dollars in 2023 and 182.7 billion in 2024. Number of billion-dollar disasters: 28 in 2023, a record, and 27 in 2024. A note says NOAA retired the series in May 2025. 2023 cost92.9 US$ billion and events2024 cost182.7 US$ billion and events2023 events28 US$ billion and events2024 events27 US$ billion and events
Cost and number of events are drawn on separate scales and are not combined. NOAA retired the series in May 2025, so no figure follows 2024.5,11,6Sources: NOAA NCEI; NOAA Climate.gov; NOAA NESDIS. As of 8 May 2025.
Figure 2 in words, and its data

Left panel, cost in billions of US dollars: 2023, 92.9; 2024, 182.7, highlighted, the fourth costliest year in the series. Right panel, number of separate billion-dollar events: 2023, 28, highlighted as the record; 2024, 27. Notes: 2023 set the record for the number of events; NOAA retired the series in May 2025.

YearEventsCostNote
202328 11US$92.9 billion 11Record number of events
202427 5US$182.7 billion 5Fourth costliest year; last year of the series 6
Data of Figure 2. United States billion-dollar weather and climate disasters, cost and number of events, as published by NOAA before the series was retired in May 2025.

05One storm, five systems

One storm, five systems

The Helene record is worth reading as a method, not only as a disaster. Each step in the chain is a separately measured fact from the body responsible for it: the hurricane centre for deaths, damage and power outages; the public health agency for the shortage of intravenous solutions. Put in sequence, they show how a hazard in one place reached a hospital ward in another, and where an earlier intervention might have shortened the chain.

For the programme this is the shape of evidence that a National Working Group would assemble and a regional comparison would test: a dependency named in advance, such as a single dominant plant in a critical medical supply chain, with the records that would show its exposure to flood, its links to the grid and the time a national shortage would take to resolve. The operator stays responsible for its plant, the regulator for its rules and the health system for its patients; the evidence is shared so that each can act on the same facts.

Fig. 03How one storm crossed five systems

How one storm crossed five systems Cascade of five boxes for Hurricane Helene, September 2024: the hurricane and inland flooding; 250 deaths in the United States, at least 175 direct; 7.4 million customers, about 16.2 million people, without power; IV fluid production halted at the largest US maker; and US$78.7 billion in damage. HELENE 2024Helene2507.4 millionIV fluidsUS$78.7 bn
Each box is a separately measured effect from its own source; the arrows show the order of the cascade, not a modelled causal weight.15,16Sources: NOAA National Hurricane Center (2026); CDC (2024). As of 21 October 2026.
Figure 3 in words

Five boxes in sequence. Hazard: Hurricane Helene and inland flooding, 24 to 27 September 2024. Lives: at least 250 deaths in the United States, at least 175 of them direct. Power: 7.4 million customers, about 16.2 million people, lost power. Health supply: flooding halted the largest United States maker of intravenous and peritoneal dialysis solutions, at North Cove in North Carolina, leading to a national shortage tracked by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. Cost: 78.7 billion US dollars in damage in the United States.

06Compute meets the grid

Compute meets the grid

The fastest-moving coupling in the United States is between computing and electricity. The Department of Energy's 2024 report puts data-centre use at about 176 TWh in 2023, 4.4% of the national total, and projects a range of 325 to 580 TWh by 2028, 6.7% to 12% 7. That growth turns the siting of a data centre into a question of grid capacity, water and public-service continuity at once, and the same facilities increasingly host the digital services on which emergency management, health and finance depend.

The programme's own systems treat compute as shared infrastructure that needs the same evidence discipline as any other: NXS-COR (compute, nodes and runtimes) for capacity and placement, NXS-NET (network topology and continuity) for connectivity and NXS-NSF (trust, authorization and assurance) for access. An offer of infrastructure is never an allocation, and a configured capability is never a validated result until it has been tested and its evidence sealed.

Fig. 04Data centres could take up to 12% of US electricity by 2028

Data centres could take up to 12% of US electricity by 2028 Horizontal bar chart of data-centre share of US electricity: 4.4 per cent or 176 TWh measured in 2023, and a projected range for 2028 from 6.7 per cent or 325 TWh to 12 per cent or 580 TWh. 20234.4 per cent of US electricity2028 low6.7 per cent of US electricity2028 high12 per cent of US electricity
One measure on one scale. The 2028 band spans the low and high scenarios of the report; it is a range, not a forecast of one value.7Sources: US Department of Energy and Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory (2024). As of 2024-12.
Figure 4 in words, and its data

A horizontal scale from 0 to 14 per cent of total United States electricity. The 2023 bar reaches 4.4 per cent, 176 TWh, measured. The 2028 bar shows a light segment to 6.7 per cent, 325 TWh, the low scenario, and a solid segment from there to 12 per cent, 580 TWh, the high scenario.

YearShare of US electricityEnergy
2023, measured4.4% 7176 TWh 7
2028, low scenario6.7% 7325 TWh 7
2028, high scenario12% 7580 TWh 7
Data of Figure 4. Data-centre electricity use in the United States, measured for 2023 and projected for 2028, from the 2024 Department of Energy and Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory report.

07Three levels of cooperation, one rule of subsidiarity

Three levels of cooperation, one rule of subsidiarity

The programme organizes cooperation at three levels, and each level decides only what cannot be decided below it. At the national level, a National Nexus programme belongs to its country, with a National Desk, a National Model and a National Portfolio. Its National Nexus Consortium (NNC) is the institutional pillar, where institutions take part through six constituency councils: state and public authorities; industry and operators; academia and research; civil society and media; community and Indigenous institutions; and a cross-cutting pathway for financial institutions and regulators. A National Leadership Council (NLC) brings leaders in personal capacity, and National Working Groups (NWG) carry bounded, supervised technical work, with six domain response teams under them. In a federal country, Tribal Nations, states and territories each engage under their own authority and instruments 2.

At the regional level, a Regional Nexus Consortium compares compatible evidence on shared systems and supports the regional profiles of Reports, which never override a country's own findings; the regions and hubs page sets out the rules. The United States and Canada hubs are coordination roles at this level. At the global level, the Consortium Secretariat, held by GCRI Canada in Toronto, keeps the programme's records, calendars, decision logs and source registers 17. GRF leads leadership, institutional dialogue and the governance of Nexus Universe; GCRI stewards evidence and methods; and GRA reads the evidence for finance. GRF's council architecture applies the same principle: a regional council takes up a question only when it crosses borders.

No regional body binds a country, and withdrawal never erases other parties' lawful work 1. The United States and Mexico already govern their shared waters through a treaty and a binational boundary and water commission, and their grids through mandatory reliability standards. The programme adds compatible evidence and a neutral place to compare it; it does not add a layer of authority.

Fig. 05Three levels of cooperation, one rule

Three levels of cooperation, one rule Three stacked bands. Global: the Consortium Secretariat in Toronto, GCRI, GRF and GRA. Regional: the planned United States hub covering the United States and Mexico, the planned Canada hub, and GCRI US as a separate organization. National: the NNC, the NLC and the NWG. A side panel places the decision with the competent authority. 01GlobalSecretariat, GCRI, GRF, GRA02RegionalTwo planned hubs03NationalNNC, NLC, NWG
Each level takes up a question only when it cannot be settled below it; the decision stays with the competent authority, outside the programme.1,2,17Sources: GCRI North America region; GCRI US; GCRI Canada; Nexus Consortium model. As of 21 October 2026.
Figure 5 in words

Global band: the Consortium Secretariat, held by GCRI Canada in Toronto; GCRI leads science, evidence and methods; GRF leads leadership, dialogue and Nexus Universe; GRA leads finance, insurance and development readiness. Regional band: the United States hub, planned, covering the United States and Mexico with no host decision on record; the Canada hub, planned; GCRI US, a separate organization scoped to United States systems. National band: each country owns its programme, with a National Desk, National Model and National Portfolio; the NNC brings institutions through six constituency councils, with the National Standards Council as its standards function; the NLC brings selected leaders in personal capacity; the NWG brings experts in bounded, supervised work with six domain response teams. An arrow labelled subsidiarity runs upward; a panel states that the decision is taken by the competent authority, operator or financial institution, outside the programme.

08What is on record, and what is not

What is on record, and what is not

Four facts are on the programme's record for this hub today: the planned coordination role and its two-country coverage; its focus; the five shared systems of the North America region; and the regional desk at northamerica@therisk.global, with GCRI US reachable at gcrius@therisk.global 1,2. The state of each participant is kept in the programme's participation records, and the meaning of each state is explained on programme status.

The programme states its separations as a list, and each applies here. A submitted application is not membership. A claimed identity is not representative authority. A payment is not an appointment or access to restricted data. An infrastructure offer is not an allocation. A report candidate is not a released publication. A research coverage profile is not a constituted consortium or a local office. A planned hub is not an operational site. Readiness evidence is not a financing or underwriting decision.

09How the region's risks are measured

How the region's risks are measured

The evidence is plentiful but fragmented across agencies. Disaster losses came from NOAA's National Centers for Environmental Information until the series was retired 5,6; hurricane impacts from the National Hurricane Center 15; medical supply disruptions from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 16; trade from the Census Bureau 4; data-centre demand from the Department of Energy 7; treaty waters from the Congressional Research Service and the boundary and water commission it describes 3; and sector definitions from the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency 12.

The programme's shared evidence environment organizes this work through twenty systems, each named by its Nexus Standards code. For this hub the most used would be NXS-GRX (canonical data, provenance and risk), NXS-DSS (decision cases and deliberation) and NXS-EWS (multi-hazard monitoring and warning), with the compute and continuity systems above 1. Every record carries an evidence label, observed, modelled, scenario or estimated, so that a measured outage count is never presented as a model output, and a projected range never as a forecast of one value.

10The instruments that already govern shared risk

The instruments that already govern shared risk

Cooperation starts from instruments the two countries already own. The programme aligns its evidence to them and never substitutes for them.

YearInstrumentStatus and relevance
1944Treaty on the utilization of waters of the Colorado and Tijuana Rivers and of the Rio GrandeIn force; administered by the binational boundary and water commission through minutes, including Minute 323 (2017) and Minute 331 (2024) 3
ContinuingNERC reliability standardsCover the bulk power system in the United States, Canada and part of Mexico 10
ContinuingSixteen critical infrastructure sectorsThe federal sector structure for security and resilience 12
2015Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015–2030In force to 2030; the global frame for disaster risk reduction 18
2024World Bank catastrophe bonds for MexicoUS$420 million for earthquake and Atlantic storms and US$175 million for Pacific hurricanes, US$595 million of cover in 2024 19,20
Selected instruments that govern shared risk between the United States and Mexico and within the United States, with their status as of 21 October 2026.

11Standards the programme brings

Standards the programme brings

The programme's own standards are proposed, not adopted, and each country decides whether and how to use them through its National Standards Council. The Nexus Standards profile for global and systemic risk, with the standards for compound and cascading hazards, critical infrastructure and critical entities and supply-chain and trade risk, give the region a common vocabulary for the chains this page describes; the risk standards are indexed under NRS. Risk Academy teaches the same material on systemic and cascading risk in the open.

12What institutions can do now

What institutions can do now

At service level R0, participation begins with a question. The routes below are open today; applications, payments, compute allocations and registrations open only when their team, terms and review capacity exist.

  • Federal, state, Tribal, territorial and municipal bodies: send a material question on a shared system to the regional desk at northamerica@therisk.global, to GCRI US at gcrius@therisk.global, or through the enquiry form; the reply gives a reference and the next step.
  • Utilities, water managers, manufacturers and data-centre operators: propose a dependency to examine, such as a single-source plant, a treaty-dependent water supply or a grid connection; operators keep full responsibility for their systems throughout.
  • Universities and research institutes: bring a method, a dataset or a case through contributing to the quarterly reports, credited to you and published under CC BY 4.0 where it is your own work.
  • Supervisors, insurers and development lenders: read the region's finance questions with GRA on its North America programme, on protection gaps and on insurance and public pools.
  • Tribal Nations and community institutions: propose how a question should be framed and governed before evidence about your lands, waters or people is gathered; consent and data sovereignty come first.

13What is changing

What is changing

  • A public loss baseline has ended. With the billion-dollar disaster series retired after 2024, comparable and documented loss records must come from elsewhere 6.
  • Compute as a grid load. A range of 6.7% to 12% of national electricity by 2028 makes data-centre siting a reliability and water question 7.
  • Single-plant medical supply. Helene showed that one flooded plant can create a national shortage of intravenous solutions 16.
  • Treaty water under drought. Repeated Rio Grande shortfalls and the first denial of a Tijuana delivery request in 2025 put shared water at the centre of bilateral relations 3.
  • Sovereign risk transfer next door. Mexico's 2024 catastrophe bonds give US$595 million of cover, a model for pre-arranged finance 19,20.

14Three faces of cooperation

Three faces of cooperation

The same question looks different to a scientist, a convenor and a financier, and all three are needed for a decision to hold. GCRI leads on science, methods and evidence and holds the Secretariat; GRF leads leadership, institutional dialogue and the governance of Nexus Universe, with its regional view on regional cooperation and North America; and GRA reads the evidence for finance, insurance and development readiness, ending in lawful handoffs to the institutions that decide. Every stage follows the Nexus cycle of question, evidence, build, organize, test, publish, decide and renew, with the test stage held in the Nexus Universe annual cycle and its application at universe.nexus; the programme year, status and service levels, finance readiness and National Nexus are documented in full.

What this page does not claim: the United States hub is a planned coordination role with no host decision on record and no city named for it; it is not an office, a public authority or a representative of any federal, state, Tribal, territorial or Mexican government, city or institution. GCRI US is a separate organization that claims no relationship with any specific government body. Naming NOAA, CISA, the CDC, NERC, the World Bank or any agency is not a claim of partnership or endorsement. Neither country has a constituted national programme, and the current service level is R0. GCRI does not regulate or certify, GRF does not regulate, finance or procure, and GRA does not lend, underwrite, rate or invest.

Questions

Questions and answers

Is there a GCRI office in Washington?

No. The United States hub is a planned coordination role, not an office, and no city is named for it. GCRI US, a separate organization with its own legal identity, publishes an address in Lanham, Maryland.

Why does the United States hub also cover Mexico?

Because the two countries share treaty waters, an integrated supply chain and a coupled grid. Mexico also takes part in the Latin America and the Caribbean programme, where its southward exposures are examined.

Is GCRI US the same as the United States hub?

No. GCRI US is GCRI's United States institution, a separate organization working within GCRI's mandate. The hub is a regional coordination role of the programme; each has its own record, and neither implies the other.

Does the programme work with federal agencies?

Its scope includes federal, state, Tribal and territorial interfaces, each engaged under its own authority. No relationship with a specific government body is claimed; one would be shown only with a record.

How do I start?

Write to the regional desk at northamerica@therisk.global or to gcrius@therisk.global, or use the enquiry form at therisk.global. You receive a reference and the next step; today the programme offers information and enquiries only.

Terms

Glossary

Planned hub
A regional coordination role for a group of countries; it operates only once a host decision is on record, and is never an office or an exclusive territory.
Acre-foot
The volume of water that covers one acre to a depth of one foot, about 1,233 cubic metres; the unit of the 1944 Water Treaty.
Billion-dollar disaster
A weather or climate event in the United States whose losses reached at least US$1 billion, as counted by NOAA until the series ended after 2024.
Critical infrastructure sector
One of the 16 groups of assets, systems and networks the United States treats as vital to security, the economy and public health.
Service level R0
The current state of the programme: information and enquiries, with a durable reference for each enquiry.
Subsidiarity
The rule that a question is handled at the lowest level able to handle it; a regional body takes it up only when it crosses borders.

Reuse and cite

Text CC BY 4.0. Cite the page with its date; data tables are linked under each figure.

Sources

References

20 sources, numbered in the order they are first cited
  1. The Global Centre for Risk and Innovation (2026-10). North America region. therisk.global. Accessed 2026-10-21.
  2. The Global Centre for Risk and Innovation (GCRI US) (2026-10-20). GCRI US. therisk.global. Accessed 2026-10-21.
  3. Congressional Research Service (2025-04-24). 1944 U.S.-Mexico Water Treaty: issues in the 119th Congress. www.congress.gov. Accessed 2026-10-21.
  4. U.S. Census Bureau (2026). Trade in goods with Mexico (c2010). www.census.gov. Accessed 2026-10-21.
  5. NOAA National Centers for Environmental Information (2025-01). Assessing the U.S. climate in 2024. www.ncei.noaa.gov. Accessed 2026-10-21.
  6. NOAA NESDIS (2025-05-08). Notice of changes: billion-dollar weather and climate disasters. www.nesdis.noaa.gov. Accessed 2026-10-21.
  7. U.S. Department of Energy and Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory (2024-12). DOE releases new report evaluating increase in electricity demand from data centers. www.energy.gov. Accessed 2026-10-21.
  8. The Global Centre for Risk and Innovation (regions register) (2026-10). Six programme regions. therisk.global. Accessed 2026-10-21.
  9. U.S. Census Bureau (Canada table) (2026). Trade in goods with Canada (c1220). www.census.gov. Accessed 2026-10-21.
  10. North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) (2026). Who we are. www.nerc.com. Accessed 2026-10-21.
  11. NOAA Climate.gov (2024-01). 2023: a historic year of U.S. billion-dollar weather and climate disasters. www.climate.gov. Accessed 2026-10-21.
  12. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (2026). Critical infrastructure sectors. www.cisa.gov. Accessed 2026-10-21.
  13. Rinaldi, Peerenboom and Kelly, IEEE Control Systems Magazine 21(6) (2001-12). Identifying, understanding, and analyzing critical infrastructure interdependencies. doi.org. Accessed 2026-10-21.
  14. Buldyrev, Parshani, Paul, Stanley and Havlin, Nature 464 (2010-04). Catastrophic cascade of failures in interdependent networks. doi.org. Accessed 2026-10-21.
  15. NOAA National Hurricane Center (2026-02-17). Tropical cyclone report: Hurricane Helene (AL092024). www.nhc.noaa.gov. Accessed 2026-10-21.
  16. U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (2024-10-30). Shortage of IV and peritoneal dialysis solutions. www.cdc.gov. Accessed 2026-10-21.
  17. The Global Centre for Risk and Innovation (GCRI Canada) (2026-10). GCRI Canada. therisk.global. Accessed 2026-10-21.
  18. UN Office for Disaster Risk Reduction (2015-03). Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015–2030. www.undrr.org. Accessed 2026-10-21.
  19. World Bank (2024-04-17). World Bank issues $420 million in catastrophe bonds for renewed disaster risk protection for Mexico. www.worldbank.org. Accessed 2026-10-21.
  20. World Bank (Pacific hurricane bond) (2024-05-15). World Bank issues $175 million in catastrophe bond for Mexico's Pacific hurricane risk. www.worldbank.org. Accessed 2026-10-21.

Record

Editorial record

Facts and programme states are given as of 21 October 2026. This page is reviewed at least every 180 days and whenever a hub host decision, a programme state or a cited figure changes. It replaces an earlier version of the same page, whose description of a United States Nexus Consortium, a Washington Nexus cluster hub to be anchored by 2030 and a set of regional pathways did not match the programme's current records. Its companion for Canada is the Canada hub page on globalriskforum.com.

Published by the GCRI editorial desk under the editorial integrity policy. To report an error or request a correction, use the corrections route; corrections are dated and listed with the page.

Cite this article

GCRI editorial desk (2026, June 26). United States hub: US and Mexico shared risks. The Global Centre for Risk and Innovation. https://therisk.global/united-states-nexus-consortium-washington-nexus-cluster-hub/

Republish

Republish or translate this article free of charge, in print or online, under CC BY 4.0: keep the byline and The Global Centre for Risk and Innovation, link to the original and note any change. Figures, maps and twins made by the institutions carry the same licence; third-party data keeps its own credit line.

Attribution to paste
<p>The United States hub: shared waters, grids and supply chains of the United States and Mexico — GCRI editorial desk, The Global Centre for Risk and Innovation. First published 26 June 2026 at <a href="https://therisk.global/united-states-nexus-consortium-washington-nexus-cluster-hub/">https://therisk.global/united-states-nexus-consortium-washington-nexus-cluster-hub/</a>. Republished under CC BY 4.0 (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).</p>

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