GCRI · Foundry

Twenty technical systems

A technical environment of many systems fails at its seams: two systems each believe they own the same record, an interface changes without notice, or a downstream tool computes its own version of a figure that already exists upstream. The canonical inventory gives each Foundry system one contribution, one boundary and one owner per record type. This page sets out how interface and ownership failures develop and spread, how they are measured, and what system owners and reviewers need to keep the inventory true.

01Register

Twenty technical systems on the record.

02The question

Twenty technical systems: how the risk develops.

Canonical Foundry system inventory. The dossier below sets out how the risk develops, what is measured, where the data come from, how it is modelled and who decides.

Mechanism

Duplicate ownership

When two systems both write the same kind of record, they diverge silently. Each looks correct alone; the conflict appears only when a decision draws on both and finds two answers to one question.

Mechanism

Interface drift

A field changes meaning, a unit changes, an optional value becomes required. Consumers built against the old contract keep running and produce plausible but wrong output. Versioned contracts with compatibility checks on every build are the standard defence.

Mechanism

Shared dependencies

Many systems depend on one identity service, one message bus, one library or one cloud region. A fault or vulnerability there reaches every dependant at once, which is why dependency maps and software bills of materials matter.

Mechanism

Authority creep

A system built to support a decision begins to make it: a dashboard threshold becomes an automatic action, a draft becomes a release. Boundaries written into each system definition and enforced at policy gates keep support from becoming authority.

03Monitor

Workspace and job console.

The screen a team would use to follow this subject: its measures, states and decisions. Names are examples and values are illustrative.

Workspace and job console

Twenty technical systems · Project space 12 · Cluster east

  • Jobs running
    20Active
  • Queue wait, p50
    8minNormal
  • Runs today
    5327
  • Quota used, % this month
    85Watch
IllustrativeGCRI · Foundry

Jobs

J-77261Flood model ensembleProject owner00:10:12Running
J-22526Tile render, zoom 0 to 12GIS workspace00:01:40Running
J-65648Evidence exportModel steward00:00:55Done
J-53084Agent tool call batchAgent sandbox00:01:51Policy block

Policy events

  1. 10:28GateAgent call needs human approval
  2. 10:33InfoRun record sealed
  3. 11:58WarnQuota at 80 pct for project
Workspace and job console: the screen’s structure, terms and states for Twenty technical systems.Example names and illustrative values; a design, not a record or a live system.
05Methods and evidence

How twenty technical systems is modelled, measured and tested.

The model, its assumptions, its data and its uncertainty, in the form a scientist or engineer would check. Structures follow published methods. The values drawn are illustrative, not findings.

Model, equations and assumptions

The model structure used for twenty technical systems, the assumptions it makes and how each is tested.

Risk of element iRi = f(Hi, Ei, Vi, Ci)hazard, exposure, vulnerability and coping capacity
Expected annual lossEAL = ∑k pk · Lkover events k with annual probability pk
Coupled systemsxt+1 = A xt + B ut + εtA carries the couplings, u the shock, ε the error
AssumptionWhy it is madeHow it is tested
Hazard and exposure are independent within an eventKeeps the loss integral tractableCompare with a copula fit on joint records
Couplings are linear near the operating pointLets shocks propagate through APerturb beyond the linear range and compare
Vulnerability curves transfer between placesLocal curves are rarely availableValidate against observed losses where they exist
Inputs
versioned datasets with provenance
Outputs
distributions, never single numbers
Code
released with the model card and tests
Reproduction
same data, code, environment and seed
Standard risk and state-space formulations; the assumptions listed are typical of the method, stated for review, not results.
FAIR guiding principles · GO FAIR and FORCE11W3C PROV · World Wide Web ConsortiumGuidance on consistent treatment of uncertainties · IPCCCEOS Analysis Ready Data · Committee on Earth Observation Satellites
06Indicators

What is measured, and how well.

Each indicator carries its unit, its cadence, the kind of source behind it and the evidence label a value would carry. No values are shown: a programme supplies them under its own authority.

IndicatorUnitCadenceSource typeLabel
Record types with more than one declared ownercountper releaseSystem registryDECLARED
Breaking interface changes detectedcount per releaseper buildContract compatibility checksOBSERVED
Components with a current software bill of materialsproportion of deployed componentsper buildSBOM generation recordsOBSERVED
Known exploited vulnerabilities in dependenciescount opendailyScans against public advisoriesOBSERVED
Time to remediate critical dependency vulnerabilitiesdaysper advisoryChange and release recordsOBSERVED
Release artefacts with build provenance attestationsproportion of artefactsper releaseSigned build attestationsOBSERVED
Systems with a documented boundary and ownerproportion of inventoryquarterlySystem registryDECLARED
07Sources

Where the evidence comes from.

Named public datasets and institutional records, each with its licence class. Sources by agreement are used only under their terms and never republished.

SourceWhat it givesLicence class
OpenAPI SpecificationMachine-readable HTTP interface contracts that can be compared for breaking changeApache 2.0
Protocol Buffers language specificationCanonical service and message contracts with defined compatibility rulesOpen source, BSD-style
CycloneDX and SPDX specificationsFormats for software bills of materials, licences and component provenanceOpen specifications
OSV vulnerability databaseOpen-source vulnerability advisories keyed to package versionsCC BY 4.0
National Vulnerability Database (NIST)Vulnerability records with severity scoringPublic domain
CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalogueVulnerabilities with evidence of active exploitationPublic domain
OpenSSF Scorecard resultsAutomated checks of security practice in open-source dependenciesFree and open
08Decisions

Who decides, and what the evidence serves.

Foundry prepares evidence. The decisions below are taken by the authorities named, under their own rules, and never by the platform.

Who decidesThe questionEvidence this page serves
System ownersWhether a change to their system’s contract or record ownership may proceedCompatibility check results; the consumers of the affected contract
Security officersWhich dependency vulnerabilities must be fixed before release, and which are accepted with a recorded rationaleBills of materials matched against advisories; exploitation status
Architecture reviewersWhether a new capability belongs in an existing system or needs a new boundaryInventory, record ownership map and the proposed contract
Contracting institutionsWhich systems their agreement covers and what each may do with their dataSystem boundaries and the record types each one reads and writes

Outputs this topic produces

  • Inventory of systems with contribution, boundary and record ownership
  • Interface contracts with version and compatibility history
  • Dependency maps and software bills of materials per release
  • Boundary statements of what each system must never do
09Core questions

What a system inventory has to answer.

  • Which system is the authoritative owner of each kind of record?
  • Where does each system’s authority stop, and who decides beyond that point?
  • How do systems exchange records without copying and diverging?
  • Which shared controls apply to every system, so that trust does not depend on each one’s configuration?
10The inventory

Twenty systems, one line each.

Descriptions are of the design. A system page is not a statement that the system is operating for any tenant.

11Mechanisms

One trust spine, composed records.

The systems share one trust spine, the NXS-NSF Sovereignty Framework, so identity, policy and receipts work the same way everywhere. Records are composed rather than duplicated: NXS-NST, NXS-DSS and NXS-EWS use The Global Risks Index (NXS-GRX) products instead of inventing their own risk figures, and NXS-POR publishes only what has passed a public-safe release decision. This is ordinary systems-engineering discipline, a single source of truth per record type and explicit interfaces between subsystems, applied to risk work.

Boundaries are part of each definition. DSS supports analysis, but analysis is not the decision. EWS supports forecast verification and warning packages, but issuing warnings stays with authorised parties. AAP evaluates triggers and readiness, but never releases funds or dispatches resources automatically. Rails records instructions and receipts between institutions, and a receipt is not settlement or external acceptance. Labs runs reproducible experiments, and experiment results are not certification.

12Methods

How it is studied, and what the methods cannot say.

13Where this page’s references

Where this page’s references lead.

The bodies and documents this page is read against. Status and editions change; each link goes to the issuing body.

14Questions

Questions and answers.

Why does every record type have one owner?
Because two writers of the same record will diverge. One owner, with other systems composing its records through explicit interfaces, is ordinary systems-engineering discipline and the main defence against conflicting figures.
What is a software bill of materials?
A machine-readable list of the components, versions and licences inside a piece of software. It lets a security team answer quickly, after a new advisory, which releases contain the affected component.
Why are the systems written in several languages?
Each language plane has a defined role: product interfaces and orchestration in TypeScript, fleet and infrastructure control in Go, trust and evidence in Rust, AI and earth observation adapters in Python, advanced mathematics in Julia, authoritative state in PostgreSQL and canonical contracts in Protobuf.
Does a system page mean the system is running?
No. Pages describe the design. Whether a system is implemented, verified, deployed and observed for a tenant are separate questions, each answered by its own evidence.
Why exactly twenty systems?
The number is the registry count of the canonical inventory. It reflects how responsibilities were allocated, not a target; changes to the inventory are made in the registry and reflected on every page.
Can I use one system on its own?
The systems are designed to work together under one trust spine, and access to any of them is scoped to an authorised project.
Is the Labs system the same as Labs?
They share a name. The Labs system is the Foundry capability for governed experiments; Labs is the GCRI platform for experiments and protocols that uses it.
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